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5Introduction: Beyond the Divide
In 2011, the Institute of Women’s Studies (IWS) at Birzeit University 
launched a teaching, research and discussion initiative on “Dialoging Across 
the Religious/Secular Divide,” which aimed to address the political and 
cultural polarization between religious and secular proponents occurring 
globally, regionally and in Palestine through scholarly scrutiny, relevant 
curriculum development and democratic dialogue. The four scholars 
published in this special issue of the Review of Women’s Studies initially gave 
their presentations during the Institute’s 2011-2012 seminar series. Both the 
quality and range of their interventions and the lively discussion and debate 
that ensued with Birzeit faculty and students attest to the importance of this 
project in contemporary Palestine and the region. We hope the reader of this 
special issue of the Review of Women’s Studies will find the analyses and 
observations herein stimulating to new thinking that goes “beyond the divide” 
to discover both commonalities and productive contradictions that can, in 
turn, engender further exploration of these issues. These four thoughtful 
(sometimes provocative and always stimulating) contributions do not contain 
any packaged or ready-made solutions but rather invite a conversation that 
the Institute of Women’s Studies hopes to continue.
In her contribution, Islah Jad finds that the sharp divide conventionally made 
between secular nationalists and Islamists blurs when she examines how both 
nationalists and Islamists in Palestine and elsewhere deploy the notion of an 
‘ideal woman.’ Jad also problematises the exclusionary dichotomy between 
Islamists and nationalist secularists in Palestine through probing the positions 
of the mainstream nationalist Fateh movement and the Islamist Hamas 
movement. In particular, she argues “the formal ideology of Palestinian 
Islamists largely stems not from religious texts, but from accommodations to 
contending positions.” She goes on to examine the complex relation historically 
and in the present between Arab nationalism and Islam and compares the 
contrasint points of view of two Palestinian scholars, Musa Budeiri and Jamil 
Hilal, who have debated “the linkages between religion and secularism in the 
construction of Palestinian nationalism.”
On 29 October 2011, the Institute of Women’s Studies at Birzeit University 
welcomed Professor Wael Hallaq, the Avalon Foundation Professor of 
Humanities at Columbia University, for a keynote lecture, entitled “The 
6Delusions of Modernity and the Religion of Secularism.” Professor Hallaq’s 
talk was a signal event in the lively series of talks and discussions sponsored by 
the Institute to explore (and indeed interrogate) the religious-secular divide. 
In her introduction to the lecture, Islah Jad, Director of IWS, noted that Wael 
Hallaq was “one of the most prominent scholars of Islamic law and philosophy 
of law. His primary focus is the epistemological and legal fragmentation 
commencing with the onset of modernity.” She also noted Professor Hallaq’s 
crucial and extensive scholarship on “the evolution of Islamic traditions from 
the theoretical and legal perspectives and the independent systems at the heart 
of these traditions.” Hallaq’s lecture, held in Ramallah offered a powerful 
critique of the modern state and the “moral, environmental, social and political 
crises of modernity that we all suffer from.” He also urged an “epistemological 
retrieval of our civilization and cultural identity,” and a “critical dialogue” 
with the West. Hallaq explained the modern state as a European project with 
inherent contradictions and traced the “rise of the political” (in the sense used 
by Carl Schmitt) and the “rise of the legal,” to the exclusion of the moral, 
leading to a division between “Is and Ought,” or between facts and values. 
Hallaq suggests that an Islamic state is a contradiction in terms, but that 
“Islamic governance” has must to offer to “modernity’s moral predicament.”
The transcript of Professor Hallaq’s lecture in Arabic, along with his discussion 
with Birzeit students and faculty, is available on the IWS website. In English, 
we publish here the concluding chapter of Professor Hallaq’s new book, 
The Impossible State: Islam, Politics and Modernity’s Moral Predicament 
(Columbia University Press 2013), which addresses the main themes of his 
lecture and also elaborates the signal importance, as the title suggests, of the 
“central domain of the moral.” We thank both Professor Hallaq and Columbia 
University Press for permission to publish this chapter for academic purposes.
Magid Shihade, a faculty member at Birzeit’s Ibrahim Abu Lughod Institute 
of International Studies, agrees with Hallaq on the irreducible contradiction 
between the modern nation-state and a putative Islamic state. However, 
his probing and strongly-argued “critique of a critique” also questions the 
academic critics of secularism and discusses their limitations. Shihade proposes 
a political approach that does not see binaries among secularism and religion, 
even from within Islamic history. He thus challenges assumptions in the 
academic scholarship that criticize secularism as a purely western discourse, 
and, drawing on the work of Ibn Khaldoun, points to a long tradition from 
within Islam that he argues contains a secular approach to society and politics.
Jamal Daher’s contribution also challenges long-standing assumptions, but on 
an earlier era in the history of the region. Daher, a faculty member in Birzeit’s 
7Department of Philosophy and Cultural Studies, examines the dominant trend 
of past and contemporary Arab research on Arabs before Islam in order to 
show the impact of scholars’ preconceptions on their research. He argues that 
the underlying assumption was that Arabs before Islam were capable neither 
of producing thought nor of engaging in any philosophical abstraction. His 
study shows the opposite through demonstrating not only the richness of the 
Arabic language and its subsequent capacity to serve as an epistemological 
tool capable of describing the early Arabs’ understanding of nature and of the 
necessary survival skills for life in the desert, but also their ability to accurately 
interpret their social and cultural life. His translators, editors and colleagues 
Nadim Mseis and Abdul Karim Barghouti deserve special thanks for their 
scrupulous attention to producing a readable and accurate English version of 
a complicated text.
 The Institute has previously published on-line four student papers that 
emerged from a spring 2011 course (GAD 638) on secularism and religion, 
designed and taught by Dr. Ahmed Abu Awwad. Students then presented 
their arguments and findings for discussion in the 2011- 2012 seminar series 
in which the scholars published herein gave their presentations.

9The ‘Ideal Woman’: Between 
Secularism and Islamism
Islah Jad
Conflict over the construction of gender, and in particular of the ‘ideal 
woman,’ is not a neutral or a primarily religious concern. Islamists, just 
like nationalists, seek to establish an ideal society which depends on a 
particular conception of the ideal woman (Papanek 1994; Kanidyoti 
1991, 1998; Moghadam 1994). The difference between the two - and 
the problem this poses for women - is the dedication of religious or 
fundamentalist groups to the restoration of an ideal past or a mythical 
age which allocates women to the guardianship of traditions (Roy 1999; 
Zubaida 1997, 2000, 2003).
Visions of such a past typically place strong emphasis on the role women are imagined 
to have played in infusing life with perfection. In this sense, the ideal woman might 
embody a past time in which the evocation of the “traditional family and moral 
values on which ‘our nation’ (Hawley 1994: 32) was built would be essential. Such 
a vision makes ‘traditional’ gender roles second nature in fundamentalist religion 
(ibid: 34). Thus, the ‘traditional’ Islamist ideal woman is opposed to the ‘modern’ 
ideal woman constructed by nationalist secularist discourse (ibid: 30; White 2002). 
The ideal society the Islamists strive to build is also seen as reactionary and anti-
modern (Roy 1999; Al-Azmeh 1996; Zubaida 1997).
The ongoing debate between secularists and Islamists in the Middle East 
reinforces this dichotomy. Secularism, for the Islamists, is seen as a colonial 
imposition, an entire worldview that gives precedence to the material over 
the spiritual, and promotes a modern culture of alienation and unrestrained 
hedonism. Secularism, for the secularists, is central to universal humanism, a 
rational principle that calls for the suppression, or at any rate, the restraint of 
religious passion so that a dangerous source of intolerance and delusion can 
be controlled, and political unity, peace and progress secured (ElMessiri and 
Al-Azmeh 2000, cited in Asad 2003:21).
I aim to problematise this exclusionary dichotomy between Islamists and 
nationalist secularists. In my previous work (Jad 2011), I did so by focusing 
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on the Women’s Action Department in the Salvation Party founded by 
Hamas in Palestine, I examined the formal gender ideology of the Islamic 
movement Hamas and how this formal ideology is reconstructed, re-narrated 
and practiced by Islamist women. My argument, developed here, is that the 
formal ideology of Palestinian Islamists largely stems not from religious texts, 
but from accommodations to contending positions. The ‘traditions’ that the 
Islamist, like the modernist nationalist, seeks to revive are ‘invented’ and are 
modern constructs (Hobsbawm 1983: 2-3).
In the Palestinian context, the debate between secularists and Islamists over 
the reform of the shari’a law may thus be cast as a contest between tradition 
and modernity. Given the complexities, contradictions, and ambiguities of 
modernity and nationalism (Kandiyoti 1998: 283), I question whether the 
boundaries separating the two movements - the nationalist and Islamist - are 
as clear-cut as one might imagine. Through an analysis of how nationalists 
and Islamists perceive and construct gender roles and relations, I argue that 
there may be more continuities than differences between the two.
The Shifting Nature of  Palestinian Secularism
Arab nationalism has from its origins invoked Islam as a basis for legitimacy. 
Neither Islam nor nationalism is a fixed idiom and here I argue that the brand of 
Islamic movement contesting the power of the Palestinian national movement 
is, to a great extent, a product of the failure of the secular national movement 
to deliver on its promises for national independence or state building. I argue 
that one of the elements that eased the shift to a ‘fusion’ between Islam and 
Palestinian nationalism was the defeat of the Palestinian national movement 
and the ability of the Islamic movement (Hamas) to identify itself with the 
struggle to gain Palestinian national rights.
Arab nationalism, whether in its Baathist, Nasserist or other forms, incorporated 
Islam as part and parcel of its claims of difference and was a unifying ideology 
in the quest for building what Salame calls a ‘state of legitimation’ - a move that 
derives fortification from enduring social elements, rather than insisting more 
fundamentally upon a vision for change and innovation (Salame 2001:20);. 
Al-Azem goes further to accuse the ‘secular’ nationalist elites of obstructing a 
rational understanding for the Islamic cultural heritage to become the subject 
of independent scientific methodologies and inquiries pertaining to social 
sciences. They rather used the Islamic cultural heritage as an ideological tool 
in the service of their regional, national or party politics. Thus, when the 
nationalist waves faded away, the uncritical approach to Islam and Islamic 
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heritage remained and was easily presented as untouchable core of Arab and 
Muslim identity (Al-Azem 2004).
In some of the above views the assertion that Islam was fused with Arab 
nationalism was seen as a hindrance to true secularism and true modernity. 
Many scholars referred to the fusion between religion and nationalisms in 
the modern construction of the latter. Hayes, for example remarked that 
“nationalism has a large number of particularly quarrelsome sects, but as a 
whole it is the latest and nearest approach to a world-religion” (Hayes cited 
in Asad 2003:187)). Geertz had identified the centrality of sacred symbols 
springing from religious impulses to all forms of political life, nationalist as 
well as pre-nationalist, in societies both modern and pre-modern. The symbolic 
activities that take place in the centre, Greetz suggests, give it “its aura of being 
not merely important but in some odd fashion connected with the way the 
world is built”. This is why “the gravity of high politics and the solemnity of 
high worship” are akin (Greetz 1983: 124 cited in Asad 2003: 188).
In analysing the fluctuating relationship between Islam as a religion 
and nationalism as a secular notion, Lawrence explains that Islamism or 
‘fundamentalism’ as he calls it (the controversy over the use of the terms 
Islamism or fundamentalism will be discussed below) was shaped by the 
overwhelming and new character of secularisation, much of which permeated 
not only the elite classes of Muslim countries but permanently affected all 
residents of the Muslim/Arab world through the emergence of such new 
institutions as communications, health care, education, and, above all, 
nationalism. He propounds the idea that, while nationalism was not a Muslim 
institution in origin, it was adopted by many Muslim elites as a strategy for 
coping with the otherwise intractable authority of colonial governments, 
economies, and armies (Lawrence 1987: 29). In this context, what emerged 
within nationalism in nearly every country was an enforced obedience to the 
state, with the kind of Islam advocated by the government made compulsory 
as a symbol of political loyalty as well as religious orthodoxy (ibid: 29). Thus, 
Islam was amalgamated with Arab secularism1.
1 Efforts to apply the concept of  the nation-state to Islam and to the Islamic 
umma (community of  believers) are a salient feature of  the historically 
recent Muslim exploration of  political issues. Some authors have tried to 
combine Islam with nationalism by treating Islam and Arabism (uruba) as an 
inseparable unity. Al-Bazzaz (a young Iraqi teacher), for example, denied that 
there was a contradiction between Islam and Arab Nationalism. For him, 
Islam is a national religion, the real Islam was Arab Islam and the Arabic 
language is the “soul of  the Arab Nation” (Hourani 1983: 308-9).
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In the Arab world, the fusion of religion and nationalism as a brand of 
‘secularism’ wielded amongst the post-colonial national elites was a clear 
marker of identity for these post-colonial nation-states in the Arab World. 
‘Abd El-Baki Hermassi, for example, writing on Islamism and secularism, 
summarizes the differences in the important distinction between de facto and 
de jure secularism. Whereas in the West de jure secularism called for the formal 
separation of church and state, the Arab state recognized Islam as the religion 
of society and, in this way, demobilized its political use. Although formally 
the state was not secular, in practice, these states marginalized the role of the 
mosque in politics and practised de facto secularism (Hermassi 1993 cited in 
Hatem 1994: 664-5).
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Middle East has been 
confronted by different forms of nationalisms: religious nationalism, territorial 
nationalism and ethnic or linguistic nationalism (Hourani 1983: 341-2). It is 
believed by many commentators that the nation as linguistic community has 
become dominant and superseded or absorbed other formations (Hourani 
1983; Al-Azmeh 1993; Salame 2001). However, religious nationalism 
continued to exist as an element in territorial and linguistic nationalism in the 
Middle East. Yet the linkage between religion and nationalism is not unique 
to Muslim societies. Munson sees that religious and national identity tend 
to be fused in many parts of the world. Just as Hourani thinks, for example, 
that being a Turk involved being a Sunni Muslim, a Persian a Shi’i and Arab 
consciousness is inextricably connected with Muslim consciousness (Hourani 
1983: 342), Munson states “to be really Irish is to be Catholic, to be an Arab, 
in the popular perception, is to be a Muslim (a Sunni Muslim), similarly to be 
a ‘real’ Iranian is to be a Shiite” (Munson 2003: 41). He believes that Islamists 
generally condemn nationalism, but compares the situation to Marxism’s 
denunciation of nationalism, which nonetheless used nationalistic resentment 
of foreign domination to fuel its revolutions. Juergensmeyer characterises 
religious political movements as religious nationalism. He suggests that there 
are “individuals with both religious and political interests, they respond in a 
religious way to a political situation” (Juergensmeyer 1993: 87).
Part of the confusion between the use of Islam and of Arab nationalism 
stems from the shared use of the notion of umma (community of believers 
and the Arabic translation of the word ‘nation’). Here it is important to 
note the differences. Its use by the Arab nationalists evolved as a result of 
European influence which emphasises the importance of unifying cultural 
markers (such as language, history or religion) or territorial groupings 
to include all adherents to such markers irrespective of religious identity 
13
(Hourani 1983). It was argued that the basic thrust of Arab nationalist 
ideology is supra-denominational (despite its invocations of Islamic history 
and its concessions to Islamic popular sentiment), and that it is committed 
to the doctrine of separating law and citizenship from religious affiliation 
and of confining the latter to the private domain. In brief, religion is what 
secular Arabism specifies and tries to set in its proper social place (Asad 
2003: 196). However, the history of Islam is important because it reflects 
the early unification and triumph of the Arab nation in which the ‘Arabian 
Prophet’ is regarded as its spiritual hero2.
The classical theological view of the Islamic notion of umma has a completely 
different meaning (Donohue and Esposito 1982; Tibi 1987; Asad 2003). Here 
the Prophet is not the object of national inspiration but the subject of divine 
inspiration, a messenger of God to mankind and a model for sunna (virtuous 
conduct) that, together with the Quran, each Muslim must seek to embody 
in his or her life. In this theological view, classical chronicles are not ‘history’ 
but grow out of hadith (records of the sayings and doings of the Prophet) on 
which the sunna is based, and they articulate a Quranic world view. According 
to this view, while the ‘Arab nation’ is inconceivable without its history, the 
Islamic umma presupposes only the Quran and sunna (Watt 1977 in Tibi 
1987: 64; Asad 2003: 196-7). The Islamic umma is thus not an imagined 
community waiting to be politically unified, but a theologically defined space 
enabling Muslims to practise the disciplines of din (religion) in the world. In 
this regard, the Islamic umma presupposes individuals who are self-governing 
in a distinctly Islamic way but not autonomous (Asad 2003: 197).
The expression umma ‘arabiyya, used today to denote the ‘Arab nation’, 
represents a major conceptual transformation by which umma is cut off from 
the theological predicates that gave it its universalising power, and is made 
to stand for an imagined total society, limited and sovereign like any other 
(Anderson 1983: 15). In contrast, the ummatu-l-muslimin (the Islamic umma) 
is ideologically not a society onto which state or economy can be mapped. It is 
neither limited nor sovereign, for it can and eventually should embrace all of 
2 A Christian Arab nationalist writes with admiration of  the personality of  the 
Prophet Mohammed, of  his strength of  conviction and firmness of  belief, 
and concludes: “this is the spiritual message contained in the anniversary of  
the Arabian Prophet’s birth which is addressed to our present national life. It 
is for this, in spite of  their different tendencies and their diverse religions and 
sects, that the Arab nationalists must honor the memory of  Mohammed, 
the Prophet of  Islam, the unifier of  the Arabs, the man of  principle and 
conviction” (Zuraiq cited in Haim 1962: 171) 
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humanity. Thus, according to Asad, the two are grammatically quite different 
(Asad 2003: 198).
Further conflicts may be noted between Islam as a religion and nationalism. In 
the contemporary political Islamic movements and contrary to the meaning 
of Islam at its inception, the ‘new’ meaning of Islam is inclusive of Muslims 
and exclusive of all non-Muslims, unlike nationalism. But like nationalism, 
Islam is interpreted as a political system and used for political ends which 
is a threat to secularism (Al-Azmeh 1996; Roy 1999; Tibi 1987). However, 
according to Asad, both Arab nationalism and Islamism share a concern 
with the modernising state because Islamism takes for granted and seeks to 
work through the nation-state, which is so central to the predicament of all 
Muslims. It is this statist project, he argues, and not the fusion of religious 
and political ideas that gives Islamism a ‘nationalist’ cast (Asad 2003: 199). 
Asad urges us not to focus on the ‘real motives’ of Islamists, but rather to 
look for what circumstances oblige ‘Islamism’ to emerge publicly as a political 
discourse, and how it challenges the deep structures of secularism (ibid: 199). 
Asad stresses interconnections between religion and secularism by stating that 
“although religion is regarded as alien to the secular, the latter is also seen 
to have generated religion, that in the pre-modern past secular life created 
superstitious and oppressive religion, and in the modern present secularism 
has produced enlightened and tolerant religion. Thus, the insistence on a sharp 
separation between the religious and the secular goes with the paradoxical 
claim that the latter continually produces the former” (ibid: 193).
In the Palestinian context, two scholars with contrasting points of views have 
debated the linkages between religion and secularism in the construction of 
Palestinian nationalism. Budeiri, on the one hand, argues that the fact that 
Fateh “resort to religious symbols and ideology to mobilise and enlist support, 
casts doubt on the often repeated assertion that Fateh, and by implication the 
Palestinian national movement, is a secular force” (Budeiri 1994:12). Islam, 
Budeiri assures us, was and continues to be one of the paramount elements 
of Palestinian national identity, especially inside the Occupied Territories. He 
states that “the Islamic movement in Palestine was instrumental from the very 
beginning of the British Mandate in assimilating a nationalist discourse. It is 
indeed difficult, [according to him] to establish a demarcation line separating 
Islamists from their ‘nationalist enemies” (ibid: 7).
With this view, Budeiri sees that the ‘fusion’ between Islam and nationalism 
is demeaning for the ‘real’ meaning of secularism which should be separate 
from religion. He also perceives Islam and politics in terms of continuity rather 
than discontinuity. Islam, as a symbolic reference point, functions as a cultural 
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reservoir drawn upon in the national call for resistance. The configuration of 
Islam as a political movement, depicted as cyclical or more or less unchanging, 
could be understood as a type of ‘resurgence’ of Islam (Stowasser 1987, Davis 
1987) battling on with its continuous ideological rivalry with nationalism. In 
such a view, no wonder the leader of the national movement during the British 
Mandate, Haj Amin, was put in the same basket with Ezzel-Din el-Kassam seen 
both as ‘religious’ and ‘Islamic’ However, socially, the Palestininan nationalist 
elite came from the upper notable families in Palestine, including Haj Amin, the 
Grand Mufti and the head of the Arab Higher Committee, which constituted 
the leading structure for the national struggle from 1936 to 1948.
The Arab Higher Committee’s ideology was nationalist as well as secularist 
in the sense that they aimed to establish an independent Palestinian state 
that would include Arabs and Jews. They were driven by a strong desire to 
modernise their state and society and spread education and science, following 
the model of British public schools in their curricula, with one exception - 
that in their private schools they added religion as a requirement, which was 
not taught in the public schools (Al-Tibawi 1956). They were not hostile 
to the West per se, their animosity was reserved mainly for its dominance 
and Occupation and they pursued a path of negotiation and diplomacy to 
seek independence, and, when this strategy did not work, they were pushed 
by the destitute peasants to use violence. Ezzel-Din el-Kassam, a déclassé, 
and a minor religious clerk and political exile from Syria, attained a short-
lived leadership amongst the urban poor and the uprooted peasants. The 
importance of Kassam, as a national religious leader, is that he was the first 
who called for the resistance of the British by force against the will of Haj 
Amin. Neither Kassam nor Haj Amin formed their Islamic organisations or 
movements to fight the British and the Zionist movements. In Zu’aytir’s diary 
on the 36-39 revolt it was mentioned clearly that “the rebellion, leaded by 
the nationalists, mobilised religious clergy” and not vice versa (Zu’aytir 1980: 
411). The first attempt to establish such a movement occurred when the 
Muslim Brothers in Egypt sent some delegates to connect their movement to 
similar groups in Palestine in 1935. According to Abul-Omrein, this move did 
not result in extending the Egyptian movement to Palestine (Abul-Omrein 
2000: 56), it was in 1946 that the first group for the Muslim Brothers as an 
Islamic movement was established in Jerusalem by Jamal al-Husseini one of 
the nationalist leading figures and the aid of Haj-Amin (Cohen 1982: 144).
In contrast to Budeiri, Hilal does not recognise Islam as a central factor in the 
construction of Palestinian national identity, whether under the Mandate or in 
its modern formation in the sixties. He defines secularism as a clear separation 
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of political institutions from religious ones saying that “in a national political 
field it implies that organizations, identities and ideologies have distinct 
paradigms, dynamics, and determinants that differ from those pertaining 
to the religious field” (Hilal 2002: 1). He believes that the confrontation 
with Zionist and British rule generated a secular, or nationalist, dimension 
to Palestinian identity in the form of a national individuality transcending 
that of religion, sect and locality (ibid: 1). According to him, at no stage did 
Palestinian nationalism resort to religious discourse or mythology to maintain 
its hegemony and the PLO had leading Christian figures such as George 
Habash, head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Nayef 
Hawatmeh head of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. “This 
does not contradict”, he says “the fact that most Palestinians have been and are 
still religious in the popular meaning of religiosity” (ibid: 1). However, once 
Hamas established a ‘sort of cultural hegemony’, the dominance of Islam was 
reflected in the common mode of dress, in proposed curricula for government 
schools, in the increasing use of Quranic verses in official statements and 
speeches by the PA, in the self-censorship of newspaper articles relating to 
issues that touch on religion and in the Palestinian official media3.
While I agree with Hilal that the PLO did not return to Islam as a meta-political 
point of reference (Salame 2001: 8), it accepted that marriage, divorce and 
inheritance should be based on the popular understanding of Islam. Gender 
relations within the Palestinian community under the political control of the 
PLO were governed by shari’a and not secular law. Gender relations were 
the ‘blind spot’ of commentators on Islam and secularism who failed to see 
that in matters of gender and the family, there was more continuity than 
discontinuity between the two ideologies. This confirms Kanidyoti’s opinion 
that the ambiguities of modernity are most apparent when it comes to the 
issue of the role of women in the body politic (Kandiyoti 1998: 283). In the 
meantime, Hilal, who drastically distinguishes religion and nationalism, did 
not provide an answer as to why a ‘mainly’ secular movement was in need of 
religious idioms to legitimise itself.
Analysing the ideology of Fateh as the backbone of the PLO and the 
contemporary nationalist movement, Abdel-Jawad states that Islam as a religion 
was never put aside by Fateh leadership. In his study of the subject, he reveals 
that the majority (13 out of 21) of the founding leaders of Fateh in the early 
fifties were either members of the Muslim Brothers, Islamic Liberation party 
3 Palestinian newspaper columnists have complained of  frequent censorship 
by editors of  articles that touch on religion, for fear of  provoking Islamists.
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or sympathisers (Abdel-Jawad 2003; El-Hamad and Al-Bargothi 1997). Their 
first magazine Falastinuna (Our Palestine) reflected the religious language and 
orientation of the nascent movement which, according to Abdel-Jawad, helped 
to spread the movement’s agenda amongst refugees in Gaza who came from 
a rural, conservative background. Among the old elite, Christians represented 
20%, (whereas their presence did not exceed 11%) in Fateh, all the founding 
leaders were Muslims. Such an historical background, although denied by 
Hilal, does not go against the brand of secularism of Fateh he presents.
Secular nationalism did of course play an important role in the Middle East in 
the mid-twentieth century. One thinks, for example, of Muhammad Mossadegh 
and the National Front in Iran, Nasser and Nasserism in Egypt, and the PLO 
among the Palestinians. But all these forms of nationalism eventually failed 
to produce liberation from foreign domination, not to mention their failure 
to resolve the various other social and economic problems found in most of 
the third world. Moreover, at grass-roots level, Islam suffused all these forms 
of ‘secular’ nationalism. As for the secular PLO, Fateh always made extensive 
use of common Islamic concepts such as jihad (holy war) and shahid (martyr). 
The Marxist Palestinian movements never had anything like the popular 
appeal of Fateh. It is legitimate to point out here that the PLO’s discourses on 
modernity were conditioned not only by the encounter with Zionism, as Hilal 
claims, but also by the its troubled relations with different Arab regimes, using 
a more conservative and religious approach with the Saudis for example, more 
liberal and ‘modern’ with the Tunisians, and ‘progressive’ and ‘modern’ with 
the then Soviet Union.
One of the diagnostic criteria for unmasking the nature of a national project 
is to examine its construction of gender and gender relations, yet many writers 
and scholars who have written on Hamas and Palestinian nationalism (Hroub 
1996, 2000; El-Hamad and Al-Bargothi 1997; Abul-Omrein 2000; Al-Taheri 
1995; Abu ‘Amr 1994; Litvak 1996; Schiff and Ya’ari 1989; Hilal 1998; 
Munson 2003), are silent on this question.
Those authors who insist Palestinian national identity was mainly based on 
secular idioms have to homogenise this identity; they do not want to see how 
nationalism and its multiple identities are permeated by class, gender, and 
religion (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989; Kandiyoti 1991). Kandiyoti, for 
example, demonstrates that “although many (nationalisms) were influenced by 
the ideas of the enlightenment and were of secular persuasion, they unwittingly 
endorsed the notion that any changes in the position of women could only 
be condoned in the national interest” (Kandiyoti 1991a 410). Nationalist 
ideologies need an ‘ideal woman’ but she is ambiguous. Fateh perceived 
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gender relations and the ‘ideal woman’ as carrying, as Kandiyoti puts it, “their 
own ambiguities and tensions” (Kandiyoti 1998: 282). The ‘ideal woman’ 
was portrayed as the peasant, who is fertile, modest and ‘authentic’. However, 
at the same time ‘the modern woman’ was portrayed as the disciplined, de-
eroticised body, the ‘sister of men’. In other words, the Palestinian national 
movements portrayed women as the “privileged repository of uncontaminated 
national values” (Kandiyoti 1991a: 410). The parallel models of woman have 
persisted through Fateh, the PLO and the PA.
Fateh always resisted challenging the patriarchal control of women within 
the PLO. The many attempts by activists in the General Union of Palestinian 
Women to promote and protect women’s rights in divorce, marriage and 
inheritance failed. They attributed this failure to the refusal of the head of the 
PLO to endorse any such move or, according to Khaled and Salah, “to question 
the flagrant abuse and exploitation of some of the Fateh fighters whether in 
the uncontrolled practices of polygamy, the failure to recognise their children 
from undeclared marriages or the many cases of domestic violence” (Laila 
Khaled and Samira Salah, Interviews).
This might serve to explain the ease with which support for a secular PLO 
comprised of men and women, was transformed into sympathy, and, in many 
cases, even allegiance, to the Islamic movement. The increasing politicisation of 
gender and religious identities might call into question the ‘progressiveness’ of 
the secular Palestinian national unity and the unity of the Palestinian national 
identity. The increasing popularity of Islamists has its roots not only in cultural 
or ideological premises but it is also related to some important changes that 
occurred in the West Bank and Gaza after the Israeli Occupation in 1967.
Islah Jad is the Director of the Institute of Women’s Studies at Birzeit University
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The Central Domain of the Moral
Wael Hallaq
An excerpt from Chapter 7 of  Professor Wael Hallaq’s 2013  book,  The 
Impossible State: Islam, Politics and Modernity’s Moral Predicament 
(Columbia University Press) is published here by the kind permission 
of Professor Wael Hallaq and Columbia University Press. The editor’s 
introduction to this special issue of the Review of Women’s Studies has 
a brief summary of Professor Hallaq’s lecture at Birzeit University 
that may be helpful in providing context for this chapter.
Editor
“Love thy neighbor as thyself ” is the very soul of the moral point 
of view, which demands that we regard another’s good as having 
the same direct claim on our attention as our own good expectably 
does. And those wedded to an instrumentalist approach will 
naturally refuse to attach any rational sense to the idea, holding 
that our allegiance to morality has to be grounded in the pursuit 
of our own interests, and finding themselves therefore unable to 
explain why our moral attention should extend to strangers and 
to the weak, as it obviously must if another’s good weighs with 
us independently of our own. Yet though I have quoted Scripture 
to bring home the import of a non-instrumentalist conception of 
morality, can one really maintain that it makes sense only within 
a religious world-view? Do we not judge the worth of a religion 
by moral principles we know in our heart of hearts to be right, 
including the very one in question?
Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality
© 2012 Columbia University Press. All Rights Reserved
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Modern Islamist discourses assume the modern state to be a neutral tool of 
governance, one that can be harnessed to perform certain functions according 
to the choices and dictates of its leaders.1When not used for oppression, the 
machinery of state governance can be turned by leaders into a representative 
of the people’s will, determining thereby what the state will become: a liberal 
democracy, a socialist regime, or an Islamic state implementing the values and 
ideals enshrined in the Qurʾān and those that the Prophet had once realized in 
his “mini-state” of Medina. The modern state is then seen by them just as logic 
was seen by Aristotle and the Aristotelians, namely, as a neutral technique or 
instrument guiding correct thinking about any issue or problem in the world-
until, that is, it was shown centuries after Aristotle, by Muslim intellectuals 
themselves, that Aristotelian formal logic and the theory of universals on which 
it rests was inherently saturated with particular metaphysical assumptions 
that predetermined the nature of its premises and therefore its conclusions. 
The very use of this logic meant an a priori acceptance of a certain brand of 
metaphysics, one that most Muslim intellectual’s rejected.2
The modern state is no different, for it comes with its own arsenal of 
metaphysics and much else. It inherently produces certain distinctive 
effects that are political, social, economic, cultural, epistemic, and, no less, 
psychological, which is to say that the state fashions particular knowledge 
systems that in turn determine and shape the landscape of individual and 
collective subjectivity and thus much of the meaning of its subjects’ lives.
As no idea or thought can come into existence outside of a human context, 
and as no event or act can be conceivable outside time or space, the state-as 
both abstract thought and concrete practice is product of a unique historical 
experience. As a paradigm of governance, it evolved in Europe and was later 
nurtured by Euro-America, and it subsequently was exported to the colonies 
and the rest of the world. As we have seen, the modern state is uncomfortably 
seated in many parts of the world, suffering from lack of legitimacy and unable 
to rule hitherto unhomogenized subject populations. We often characterize 
these as “weak” or “rogue” states, euphemisms for the fact that a nonindigenous 
form of political control has, relatively recently and without “preparation,” 
been violently imposed on colonized societies that never knew or had never on 
their own or willingly adopted such a form. This perhaps is the most evincive 
evidence of the foreignness of the modern state, an entity that is-historically, 
substantively, and conceptually-thoroughly Euro-American.
However, none of this should mean that the modern state is an immutable 
phenomenon, that it does not and cannot change, that it has not adapted or 
could not adjust to an ever-changing world. For it is hardly deniable that the 
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state of the nineteenth century had noticeably evolved by the middle of the 
twentieth, and today’s state, as we saw in the preceding chapter, continues to 
undergo certain changes in response to, inter alia, the emerging challenges of 
globalization. Yet none of these changes and none of the otherwise persistent 
structures of the modern state have ever proven themselves compatible 
with even the basic requirements of Islamic governance. In fact, instead of 
rendering the modern state less objectionable, the mutations of the last three 
decades, especially in the direction of so-called globalization, have increased 
their incompatibility progressively. It should not by now come as a surprise 
that this incompatibility is ultimately a moral one.
1. The Major Incompatibilities
Let us, by way of summary, count some of the important ways in which this 
incompatibility manifests itself, while realizing that no single one is mutually 
exclusive of the others. First, as an anthropocentric entity, the state possesses 
a metaphysic that resides within its own boundaries as sovereign will. The 
metaphysic generates its own meanings, which is to say that its particular 
views of the world are of its own creation and bound by its own standards, 
however changeable these standards may be. As the highest manifestation of 
positivism, the state possesses and displays a metaphysic of the here and now, 
reflecting its own concepts, structures, and practices. What Is for the state is its 
truth of will, its will to power, all other truths being marginal and subordinate. 
By stark contrast, no form of Islamic governance can permit positivism, nor 
is there a place for a metaphysic that issues therefrom. If the autonomy of the 
moral is the highest of all desiderata, then metaphysics, which foregrounds 
moral autonomy, cannot descend to positivism. If moral autonomy must 
lead, if it must be the determinant of all determinants, then metaphysics must 
necessarily transcend the narrow domain of positivist anthropocentricism. 
The two metaphysics, therefore, stand in an irreconcilable deadlock.
Second, and flowing from the former consideration, Islamic governance 
cannot permit any sovereignty or sovereign will other than that of God. If 
morality is to guide human actions, if it be autonomous, then it must rest on 
universal and eternal principles of truth and justice, principles that transcend 
the manipulation and whims of a positivist entity. It must determine the limits 
of human actions, drawing a line of separation between what can and cannot be 
done and curbing the domain of the rational when this leads to the violation of 
its own domain. In Islamic governance, where-as we have seen-the rule of law 
takes on one of its most supreme expressions, no earthly sovereignty is allowed 
to compromise the dictates of moral autonomy. If transcendent morality 
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imposes on us the protection of the poor and the weak, if it creates for them 
an inherently natural right against the wealth of the rich, then no economic 
development or capitalist principle can be allowed to override this will. If this 
morality dictates a humane treatment of others, then no political or scientific 
calculation whatsoever can be permitted to reduce another’s humanity by any 
measure, to let her starve or send him to the gas chambers, simply in the 
name of science and rationality. As Paul Kahn aptly observed, there are no 
principles of restraint on the use of force in a polity that “understands itself 
as the expression of popular sovereignty under the rule of law.” On the other 
hand, a “state that understands itself as an expression of a divine or a natural 
order can look to meanings outside of itself to limit its actions.”3
Islamic governance is thus bound by a sovereign will outside of and higher than 
itself, whereas the modern state’s sovereignty represents an inner dialectic of 
self-constitution: sovereignty constitutes the state and is constituted by it. These 
two opposed conceptions of sovereignty will inevitably stand in a deadlock.4
Third, and flowing from the former two considerations, if God is the only 
sovereign-which is to say, if God is the ultimate source of moral authority-
then any system that regulates human behavior must heed the general norms 
and technical rules and regulations derived from and dictated by the higher 
moral principles. This, for Muslims past and present, is the true and ultimate 
meaning of the rule of law. As we saw in chapter 3, the best form of separation 
of powers in the paradigmatic modern state suffers from defects that render 
the system, even as an elaborate theory, inconsistent, confused, and even a 
“failure.”5 If the modern state as a sovereign will inherently bestows on the 
executive branch powers formidable enough to chip away at the legislative, 
then the rule of law would have to be defined in terms of executive will as much 
as of that of legislative will. At the same time, judicial review chips away at the 
latter will still further, reducing its purview and narrowing its competence. 
Such a constitutional arrangement, integral to the structures of the modern 
state, would be unthinkable in any form of Islamic governance, making the 
two arrangements, both in theory and in practice, largely incompatible.
Fourth, and reflecting the aggregate effects of the former three considerations, 
the modern state produces subjects that differ from those produced by any 
form of Islamic governance in profoundly political, social, moral, epistemic, 
and psychological ways. The microcosmic insistence of the Muslim subject on 
the unity of the Is and Ought is a faithful representation of the macrocosmic 
Sharʾī (and Sufist) insistence that fact and value are one and the same, that 
all existence is a unity, and that the term “poor” in Qurʾānic discourse and 
in Muslim social and economic life is not a statistic or a scientific datum. 
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In the very terms “poor” and “poverty,” the value of an inherent right to aid, 
assistance, and compassion is intertwined with and indistinguishably meshed 
into the fact of descending into poverty. There is no “poor” in the vocabulary 
and conceptual categories of Islamic governance that can be distinguished in 
any way from the deontological moral value not only of the poor’s right to aid 
but also of a commensurate duty incumbent upon those who can provide it. 
This type of nondistinction is pervasive, extending to nature and the nature 
of things. Everything in the world is the work of One Agent who created 
one and all for a reason. No “atom of a good or bad deed” can be separated 
from any atom of sand or seed. Everything is interconnected, and all things 
are but One. Living in the world is living in the Kingdom of God, with all 
of its fortunes and misfortunes, its good- and evildoers, its trees and rivers, 
its poor and rich. To live in this world is to accept the majestic wisdom of 
its Creator, as manifested in His creation. It is to accept humanity with its 
honorable strengths and dishonorable weaknesses. But it is also to accept the 
necessity and the paradigmatic desideratum of striving to be good and of being 
thankful for being alive and for the bounties bestowed upon humankind, 
however small or large they may be. It is to surrender to the majesty of this 
creation, our transient abode and our test of goodness. There is no reason 
for humankind to exist other than to prove, in heart and deed, the extent 
to which they can do good. Doing good is the heart and soul, the core and 
kernel, and the most pronounced message of the Qurʾān and therefore of Islam 
and Islamic governance. If there is Hell and Heaven, punishment and reward, 
and if God is the One, the Punisher, the Compassionate, and the Merciful, 
it is all deployed for one purpose and one purpose only: To create the good-
doer and hence the good community, for there would be no meaning for his 
Oneness, Mercy, and Wrath without this concept of good.
But the call to goodness is not an ambiguous invocation, a moral injunction 
devoid of content. To be good is both a defined and defining concept that 
can be located within the five pillars of religion, pillars that Islam-from the 
beginning until this very present-never questioned and, more importantly, 
never abandoned. If the pillars are by definition exclusivist-and they are-it is 
because everything other than them is subsidiary and subordinate. If these 
are the pillars, then everything else is not. But since the Sharīʾa and Islamic 
governance must, by necessity, regulate all human behavior,6 then that which 
is not a pillar must conform to the pillars’ dictates and aggregate will. Which 
is to say that the structure and operation of the pillared system predetermines 
both the subject and subjectivity, preparing them to embark upon that which 
lies in the nonpillared world And the pillars, accurately reflecting the tenor of 
the Qurʾānic philosophy, are anchored in a simple message: understand your 
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place in the world; understand your own transience; understand that you are 
created as part of a community and of a family that together feed your soul, 
just as plants and grains feed your body; understand that all this is a gift that 
comes with a responsibility toward everything around you; understand that 
you really own nothing, that you will inevitably face your end and that you 
will take nothing with you to the grave except your good deeds, your good 
name; understand that you have duties toward the world in which you have 
been created, toward the community that was created for you and that is your 
anchor. Take nothing for granted.
It is this foundational understanding that underlies a set of performative acts 
and utterances which have a cumulative shaping effect on the body, soul, 
and mind. In their entirety, these acts are private, internal, and thus affective. 
From prayer and fasting-which both locate themselves in that foundational 
understanding-to pilgrimage and almsgiving, the total effect of these acts 
tends to shape the Muslim subject, fulfilling the desideratum of the Sharīʾa, 
of Islamic governance, and therefore of the art of living itself. The remaining 
Sharʾī laws and rules presuppose such a subject and operate-in one strong 
sense-as the addendum and annotation of this morally formed subject.
By stark contrast, the subject of the modern state is not wholly formed by 
the moral imperative. The conventional morality of tradition is constantly 
contested by a state-oriented technology of the self that systemically and 
systematically operates to create the national citizen. The contest is summed 
up with pinpoint precision in the statement that “it is not the duty of the state 
to make us good. That is our business.”7
The duty of the state, fulfilled maximally and most faithfully through 
education and nationalistic discourse-among much else-is to create the 
efficient and productive citizen, the subject of “law and order” who is willing 
to die for his country and nation. Whereas Islam-as we have seen-does not 
command sacrifice of life, even for the sake of God, the modern nation-state 
is inconceivable without this requirement. But there is another difference still. 
Whereas the aggregate effects of Islamic governance are intended to fashion 
the moral subject who inter-acts responsibly with an anima mundi and with 
community and family, the subject of the modern state is an exteriorized 
personality whose soul and spirit are of no concern but whose value resides in a 
political, materialistic, and efficiency-based conception of life. Put differently, 
whereas the Muslim subject strives for moral improvement, the state’s subject 
strives to fulfill sovereign will, fictitiously a representation of the subject’s own 
will but realistically the will of a commanding sovereign. The difference is a 
paradigmatic one between a continuous and unending moral struggle for the 
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Ought and a continuous and unending worldly struggle for the Is, which 
aims to maintain a hold over the material bounties of an otherwise brute 
world of fact. The subject of Is and the subject of Ought are two drastically 
different human subjects. They stand not only in diametrical opposition but 
in irreconcilable contradiction.
Fifth and finally, the modern state, in its collaboration and contestation with the 
globalization project, remains engaged in a preeminently material world of Fact. 
It depends on and promotes a homo economicus whose exclusive and ultimate 
desideratum is material profit and little else. This stands in sharp contrast with 
the morally constructed homo economicus of Islam and its governance, a species 
that is subordinated to a higher moral imperative. This latter subject is neither 
contingent nor a mere accident in the structure and makeup of Islam and 
Islamic governance: it is of its essence. Without this moral homo economicus 
there could hardly be an Islam, Muslims, or a Muslim civilization, at least in 
the way we have come to know them. It is precisely this homo economicus that 
created, over the course of an entire millennium, a civil society that kept politics 
and executive power at bay and that defined what Islam was. The paradigmatic 
Muslim homo economicus seeks wealth and profit but remains materially and 
psychologically committed to social responsibility, as is abundantly evidenced 
in twelve centuries of Islamic socioeconomic history. Honor, prestige, nearness 
to God, and the love and respect of family and neighbor all paradigmatically 
intersect with this ethic of indebtedness to one’s own community. As everything 
is owned by the Ultimate Sovereign, wealth and profit are not possessed by 
or destined for only the rich. They are made “from” and “for the sake of the 
Ultimate Sovereign,” whose Rights are identical with those of the rights of the 
poor and unprivileged. In this equation, the poor are integral to God, and He 
is integral to them. Serve them, and you serve God; serve God, and you serve 
them. Produced by the state and pushed, though willingly, into a brute world 
of economic competition and profit, the modern subject is one who will find 
the true Muslim homo economicus a curiosity and an aberration, something 
belonging to the museum of extinct species. Raised on the moral technologies 
of the self and imbued with a mild form of asceticism, the Muslim homo 
economicus would similarly regard his modernist counterpart as irrational, 
greedy, shortsighted, and selfish-in short, a brute. The oppositions between the 
two and their utter incompatibility are nothing short of staggering.
The totality of these inherent and fundamental oppositions poses a significant 
problem. If Muslims are to organize their lives in social, economic, and 
political terms, then they face a crucial choice. Either they must succumb to 
the modern state and the world that produced it, or the modern state and the 
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world that produced it must recognize the legitimacy of Islamic governance, 
that is, the Muslim conception of polity, law, and, most importantly, morality 
and its subordinated political and economic demands. The first option would 
at first glance seem more realistic, given that at present it is largely accepted 
by Muslims and even their intellectuals, though often on the erroneous 
assumption that the system of the modern state can in good time be converted 
to an Islamic state. As I have argued in the previous chapters, this assumption 
forgoes a proper understanding of the nature of the modern state, its form-
properties, and its inherent moral incompatibility with any form of Islamic 
governance. The second option seems, to all indications, far less likely, since 
any form of Islamic governance will have to live within a system of states 
that itself is under pressure from the imperatives of a globalized world. If 
the modern state, as so many analysts tell us, must itself compete with and 
readjust under the pressure of globalization, an Islamic governance would 
suffer multiple and incremental challenges that will quite likely cause its 
decline and, as likely, total collapse.
2. A Way Out?
Yet there is something worthy of investigation beyond this realpolitik, which 
by definition rests on a skewed vision of morality. Just as the modern state sits 
uncomfortably in the Muslim (and much of the Afro- Asian) world, modernity 
as a whole sits rather problematically in the entirety of this world of ours, 
including the very Euro-America that originally produced it. Throughout 
this book, we have alluded to some of these problems, which range from the 
spiritual vacuousness of the fragmented, hedonistic, and narcissistic self to the 
destruction of the organic community, family, and natural environment-none 
of which can be dissociated from the overarching project of the modern state. 
Thus the interrogations of the modern project cannot do without placing the 
state at the forefront of critique. Nor can they do without at the same time 
placing the destruction of the environment and the natural world at the center 
of our gaze, because, as I have already argued, our attitude to and dealings 
with this natural world is the measure of our existence, of our estimation of 
what it means for us to be human beings. The consequence of these attitudes 
is not, as many think, just a fact of life, a merely unfortunate byproduct of 
our otherwise good intentions. Humanity and morality are concomitant; divine 
omnipotence, however eternal and abstract, is functionally and sociologically 
laid in the service of these grand moral imperatives. There is no meaning for 
this omnipotence without the moral imperative, for the very raison d’être of 
this omnipotence hinges on the demand for, and insistence upon, the moral 
domain. Should the moral domain one day disappear from this cosmic order, 
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then omnipotence would have no reason to continue to exist. The world was 
already created by this omnipotence, a faculty that can now be withdrawn or 
set aside, since the task has been accomplished. But if omnipotence remains, 
it is by virtue of its twin, omnipresence, this latter guaranteeing the continuity 
of the former as keeper of the moral domain.
The Qurān, the Sharīa, and the jurists who represented it for centuries 
all recognized the permanency of this moral domain. Yet all of them also 
recognized, and with equal force, the fact that the particular legal norms 
to be derived from this moral domain are situational, subject to the never-
ending ijtihād. This latter captures the soul and body of the coextensiveness 
of reason and reasons, of the constant dialectic between them that allows 
for the eternal moral domain to manifest itself variably according to time, 
need, and circumstance. If the Qurān was revealed in the idiom of the 
Arabs, it was, as it repeatedly states, for the purpose of making the moral 
domain comprehensible to them through their language and customs. The 
Sharīa followed this logic most faithfully, adopting the telling maxim-which 
it consistently and persistently practiced throughout the centuries-that “the 
Sharīa is good for all times and places.”8 And what made this possible was 
the concept and institution of ijtihād, the constantly renewed effort to reason 
the moral law, to examine at every turn and in every instance the dialectic 
between reason and reasons. In this tradition, reason was through and through 
unfailingly receptive to reasons.
3. Courses of  Action
As we saw, Sharīʾa’s moral bent was like a thorn in the side of colonialism in 
the Muslim world, a thorn that had to be extracted. Sharīʾa’s decimation in the 
nineteenth century thus sums it all up: modernity and its state could not and 
cannot accept the Sharīa on its own terms because these terms are profoundly 
moral and egalitarian, whereas the state and the world that produced it relegated 
the moral to a subsidiary domain. To state the case minimally, colonialism’s 
central domain was the economic and the political, not the moral. And so the 
economiccum-political remains as the central domain of modernity and its 
increasing globalization.
Yet despite the destructive effects of colonialism, historical Sharīʾa today 
remains, ever more forcefully, the locus of the central domain of the moral. 
While its institutions, hermeneutics, and personnel have all vanished without 
hope of return,9 its moral effects persist with unwavering stubbornness. This 
moral system, a capital of immeasurable value, can sustain at least two courses 
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of action, one internal, the other external.10
First, in line with the central domain of the moral and its imperatives, 
Muslims can now begin-especially in light of the “Arab Spring”- to articulate 
and construct nascent forms of governance that would be in due course 
amenable to further and more robust development along the same lines. 
This would require nonconformist thinking and native imagination, because 
the social units that would make up the larger sociopolitical order must be 
rethought in terms of moral communities that need, among other things, 
to be reenchanted. Historical moral resources would provide a blueprint for 
a definition of what it means to engage with economics, education, private 
and public spheres and, most of all, the environment and the natural order. It 
would also provide for a concept of communal and individual rights, which 
would require a clear understanding of the shortcomings and strengths of 
the liberal order’s concept of rights. An articulate position on rights is of the 
essence, as we will see momentarily. But internal, indigenous considerations 
of the community as the central domain of the moral would be the ultimate 
basis on which an evincive theory of antiuniversalism might be constructed, 
a theory that advocates the uniqueness of world societies but that also 
must summon up the intellectual stamina needed to provide a persuasive 
antidote to the dominating liberal concept of universalism. This initial but 
sustained process is therefore dialectical, moving back and forth between the 
constructive efforts of community building and a discursive negotiation with-
and of-the modern state and its liberal values, in both East and West. As we 
will see, insisting on the second component of this dialectic is as essential 
as the steadfastness with which the first component-the raison d’être of the 
entire project-is pursued.11 Such a steady and slowly evolving approach has 
the promise, if not the assurance, of initial success, avoiding (if not evading, 
thanks to its low-key programmatic) the forces we have identified in this book 
as antagonistic to and destructive of full-scale Islamic governance.
Second, during the long process of building nascent institutions- which 
would require a restatement of Sharī ʾa rules and a reconceptualization of 
political community-Muslims and their intellectual and political elites can 
and must engage their Western counterparts with respect to the necessity of 
positioning the moral as the central domain, which would in turn require 
Muslims to develop a vocabulary that these interlocutors can understand, a 
vocabulary that, among other things, attends to the concept of rights within 
the context of the necessity to construct variants of the moral order befitting 
each society. Here, Muslims engaged in this process would be convinced and 
would expend the utmost intellectual energy in persuading others-including 
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Muslim liberals12-that universalism and a universalist theory of rights can have 
no fate but ultimate failure.
In other words, even during this initial process of building morally based 
communities, there is much that Muslims can do13 to contribute to the 
reformation of modern moralities. Such a proposition may at first glance seem 
bold and far-fetched, but it is not, for there is at least one important moral 
strand of Western philosophical and political thought that exhibits a near 
identity with the current Islamic quest, providing intellectual energy to the 
postmodern critique, however problematically modern this critique remains. 
As we have seen, the moral quest of modern Islam, which reflects the continuing 
commitment of today’s Muslims to the central domain of the moral, finds 
its equivalent in the slim yet resounding voices of the MacIntyres, Taylors, 
and (even liberal) Larmores of the Western world. But this resemblance, nay 
commonality, is neither coincidental nor fortuitous, because all these voices-
Muslim and Christian, Eastern and Western-are responding to the same 
moral condition,14 however much their respective vocabularies and idioms 
may differ from each other. The paramount questions therefore remain: Can 
these forces, on all sides, transcend their ethnocentricity and join ranks in the 
interrogation of the modern project and its state? Can the Taylors summon 
enough intellectual courage to become MacIntyres? Can they all, Western and 
non-Western, dismantle the pernicious myth of a clash of civilizations? Can 
they augment their moral power so as to bring about a victory that installs the 
moral as the central domain of world cultures, irrespective of “civilizational” 
variants? For, just as there can be no Islamic governance without such a victory, 
there will be no victory in the first place without modernity experiencing a 
moral awakening. This has yet to happen.
The political forms which may arise in truly post-Enlightenment 
cultures will be those that shelter and express diversity-that enable 
different cultures, some but by no means all or even most of which 
are dominated by liberal forms of life, different world-views and 
ways of life, to coexist in peace and harmony. For this to be a real 
historical possibility, however, certain conceptions and commitments 
that have been constitutive, not merely of the Enlightenment and 
so of modernity, but also, and more fundamentally, of the central 
traditions of Western civilization, must be amended, or abandoned. 
Certain conceptions, not only of morality but also of science, that are 
central elements in Enlightenment cultures must be given up. Certain 
understandings of religion, long-established in Western traditions, 
not as a vessel for a particular way of life but rather as the bearer 
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of truths possessing universal authority, must be relinquished. The 
most fundamental Western commitment, the humanist conception of 
humankind as a privileged site of truth, which is expressed in Socratic 
inquiry and in Christian revelation, and which re-emerges in secular 
and naturalistic form in the Enlightenment project of human self-
emancipation through the growth of knowledge, must be given up....
It is in reaching a new relationship with our natural environment, 
with the earth and the other living things with which we share the 
earth, in which human subjectivity is not taken to be the measure of 
all things, that a turn in our inherited traditions of thought can be 
accomplished, which opens up the possibility of profoundly different 
forms of human community dwelling together on earth in peace.15
Dwelling together on earth in peace is certainly a tall order, perhaps another 
modern Utopia, but subjecting modernity to a restructuring moral critique is 
the most essential requirement not only for the rise of Islamic governance but 
also for our material and spiritual survival. Islamic governance and Muslims 
have no monopoly over crisis.
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Endnotes
1. A strong claim for state neutrality is made in An-Na’im, Islam and 
the Secular State, 1 and passim. If this claim-central and essential 
to An-Na’im’s overall thesis-cannot be sustained, then that thesis 
must be reconsidered. Similarly, see Turabi’s views (remaining no 
more than bare outlines) of an “Islamic state” that must not be 
wholly sovereign or even nationalistic. Euben and Zaman, Princeton 
Readings, 213-215.
2. For the metaphysical implications of syllogism and the theory of 
universals on which it rests, see Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyya Against the 
Greek Logicians. For a classic critique of Aristotelian metaphysics, see 
Ghazālī, Tahāfut al-Falāsifa.
3. Kahn, Putting Liberalism, 277 (obviously by now, Kahn’s use of the 
term “state”-in a context in which the “state” is subordinated to a 
higher will- must be taken in a metaphorical sense). See also Scanlon, 
“Rights, Goals, and Fairness,” 93.
4. Abou El Fadl, “Islam and the Challenge of Democratic Commitment,” 
69: “Effectively, a religious State law is a contradiction in terms. Either 
the law belongs to the State or it belongs to God, and as long as the 
law relies on the subjective agency of the State for its articulation and 
enforcement, any law enforced by the State is necessarily not God’s 
law. Otherwise, we must be willing to admit that the failure of the law 
of the State is, in fact, the failure of God’s law and, ultimately, God 
Himself. In Islamic theology, this possibility cannot be entertained.” 
However, Abou El Fadl does not tease out the full implications of this 
penetrating insight, largely taking the modern state for granted.
5. Magill, “Beyond Powers and Branches,” 605. See also Marshall, 
Consti- tutional Theory, 97, 124; Hansen, “Mixed Constitution,” 
509, and our discussion in chapter 2, section 1.
6. For the norms that must apply to any act, including one that is 
“neutral” (i.e., allowing for what we nowadays call personal/private 
choice), see Hallaq, History of Islamic Legal Theories, 40-42. It 
should be noted here that the private sphere in the modern state is 
left “unregulated” by a deliberate choice (or decision) of the state and 
not by virtue of the inherent autonomy of that sphere, for when the 
state decides that a matter in this domain must henceforth belong to 
the public sphere, there can be no criteria by which this decision is 
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judged other than that by the state’s will, which, after all, is said to 
express popular sovereignty. Further on this latter point, see Asad, 
Genealogies of Religion, 200-208.
7. Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 350 (her emphasis); see 
also Strauss, “On the Spirit,” 13.
8. The juristic manifestations of this maxim are explored in detail in 
Hallaq, Authority, Continuity, and Change.
9. 33. See Hallaq, “Can the Shariʾa Be Restored?”
10. Of course, much can be said in the way of proposing solutions to the 
challenges and problems this book raises, but an elaborate outline of 
such solutions would require writing another and much longer book.
11. A similar call, in a different contest, was issued in Massad’s important 
work Desiring Arabs.
12. Although it is very likely that a paradigmatic shift in the Western liberal 
order will, almost automatically, weaken the Muslim and Arab liberal 
movement, perhaps to the point of collapse, for Islamic and Arab 
liberalism is a current that suffers from more profound contradictions 
and incoherence than even the Euro-American liberal order. For a 
general critique of the liberal order, see Nicolacopoulos, Radical 
Critique of Liberalism; Schmitt, Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy; 
MacIntyre, After Virtue; MacIntyre, Whose Justice?; Sandel, 
Liberalism and Its Critics; Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake; Gray, Straw 
Dogs; Gray, Liberalism; Amin, Liberal Virus; Bell, “Communitarian 
Critique”; MacLean and Mills, Liberalism Reconsidered; Kahn, 
Putting Liberalism; Sprangens, Irony of Liberal Reason; and (from the 
Islamic reformist perspective) Haj, Reconfiguring Islamic Tradition, 
among countless others.
13. As already evident in the remarkable work of Ṭāha ʾAbd al-Raḥmān, 
for instance. See the list of his works in the bibliography.
14. See chap. 4, n. 99.
15. Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake, 153-155 (emphasis mine).
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Rediscovering Religion and 
Secularism: A Critique of a 
Critique
Magid Shihade
In this paper, I will discuss some aspects of the academic critique of secularism, 
and some of its limitations. I will also discuss how this scholarly critique of 
secularism has frequently been used to defend symbolic and sometimes real 
repressive social norms within Muslim societies. This discussion is in the 
context of recent developments in the Arab world, where political Islamic 
movements whose interpretations of the past have the stamp of fantasy, call 
for a return to a “real,” “non-secular,” Islamic state. Both academic and Islamic 
political arguments base their analyses on false assumptions and evasions, 
historical and otherwise, I will also propose a possible political approach that 
does not see binaries among secularism and religion and both of these and 
politics, even from within Islamic history, and which will challenge certain 
assumptions in the academic scholarship that criticize secularism as a purely 
western discourse, and will also challenge political Islamic arguments for their 
refusal of secularism as a western imposition, thus denying a long tradition 
from within Islam that I term a secular approach to society and politics.
The critique of secularism is not a totally new phenomenon, as I will show 
in the following discussion, but has been taking place in the academy for 
years in the United States as well as elsewhere (Asad 2003, 2009, Connolly 
1999, Mahmood 2005, 2006, 2012, Taylor 2007). The resulting demand 
is presented as a call for “openness,” and also of “making space for those 
supposedly marginalized in the academy.” Of course, this ignores the power of 
these religious groups in making their voice heard though television and radio 
stations, internet sites, newspapers and magazines and political representation, 
let alone in the academy itself. This call for “inclusion” and “openness” also 
ignores the fact that many institutions of higher education were specifically 
religious when founded and may continue to be so in their mission and 
practices. Hence, the call for opening space for religion and religious views 
comes only to enforce existing hegemonic forces; fundamentalist Christian 
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Zionists in the United States, and fundamentalist Islamists in the Arab world.1 
This call for “openness, tolerance, and dialogue,” can also be part of what 
is called the “interfaith industry:” Rather than being about equality, this 
industry is about keeping hegemonic forces intact, while the inclusion of so 
called minorities are only an act of tokenism that keeps the real minority 
groups on the margin. Further silencing them by such an apparent inclusion 
does not transform the reality on the ground, where members of such a group 
remain under repression and surveillance at home and abroad.2 
In the Palestinian context, in a series of talks around the question of secularism 
and religion (a binary itself ) organized by the Institute of Women’s Studies at 
Birzeit University, the call is to interrogate the apparent dichotomy between the 
official narrative of “liberal secular Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and 
a religious authority in Gaza.” Such a framing that represents the Palestinian 
Authority as representative of secularism and Hamas in Gaza as representative 
of religion is misleading. Rather than seeing them as the opposite of one 
another, one should see them as a continuum. Hamas uses religion primarily 
to gain public support, but also to control public space and vice-versa, and the 
PA, dominated by Fatah, uses religion as well to challenge Hamas hegemony 
over this issue (religion), competing on who is good/better Muslim, and 
thus reinforcing the dominant religion in the Palestinian society, rather than 
proposing an alternative. The public space in the West Bank (under PA rule) 
is largely conservative in most towns, cities, and villages, and only in a few 
places, like Ramallah, are there enclaves of liberal spaces. Birzeit University, 
for example, that was once the site and representative of what one might call 
secular nationalism is no longer as such. Last year, a prominent faculty member, 
Dr. Musa Budeiri, was under attack by student partisans of a relatively minor 
revanchist Islamist political party for posting on his door cartoons that are 
critical of social practices in Islamic society. Their protest was accompanied 
by anonymous physical threats posted on social media. Rather than being 
wholeheartedly supported by the academic community, he was criticized also 
by faculty members, although others offered support. Regrettably, his is not a 
singular case of challenge to academic freedom and freedom of expression: on 
occasion, university employees have not only opposed the invitation by faculty 
1 I use the concept of  the call for openness that enforces hegemonic forces 
from the discussion by Aditya Nigam in the Indian case, where the call for 
more space for Hinduism is explained as a call for more room for the already 
dominant identity in India (Nigam 2006). 
2 Shihade, Magid. 2011. “Interfaith Industry.” Journal of  Palestine Studies, 40, 3, 
pp.123-125.
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members of speakers that challenge social and religious taboos, but sabotaged 
these talks. Rather than taking a stand against this interference in academic 
freedom, some faculty members and officials provided further excuses for 
these employees. The effect is chilling: some departments continue to avoid 
discussing or bringing speakers to discuss issues that are considered taboo 
according to the conservative section of the society. 
With the rise of political Islam to power in the region in the last several years, 
calls for the implementation of Shari’ a came to the fore in many countries 
including in the Palestinian territories. The arguments to support such calls 
are many, including that “a real Islamic society must be run according to the 
Shar’ia and its interpretation,” as well as the argument that secularism has had its 
time in the Arab world and failed to bring solutions to the political, social, and 
economic problems in the region so why not to let political Islam have its own 
course and find solutions for these problems. Of course these calls ignore the 
fact that many Arab countries already claim Islamic governance (such as Saudi 
Arabia, and others), and even those who were not considered Islamic (such as 
Egypt, Syria or Iraq)deployed Islamic rhetoric and practices,, and in some cases 
even encouraged political Islamic parties at the cost of liberal and left parties. 
Such political use of religion sometimes draws on academic discourse that is critical 
of secularism, and thus, it is worth to reflect on some of the arguments made in 
these academic discourses before going further in discussing their limitations.
The Critique of  Secularism
Among other aspects of his critique of the discourse of secularism, Talal Asad 
correctly pointed out the misuse and abuse of the term secularism itself, often 
politically motivated in the West, and how a discourse supporting secularism 
and its values has been often used to justify western intervention in the Muslim 
world. Nonetheless, many scholarly critiques of this secular discourse have 
frequently been used to defend symbolic and sometimes real repressive social 
norms within Muslim societies. Such defensive arguments against western 
interference in social norms have relied also on scholarly work that calls for 
“cultural sensitivity,” rejection of “universalism,” and similar arguments that 
often play into the Orientalist discourse about the Arab and Muslim world, 
and allow local functionaries more space to defend repressive measures that are 
imposed on the public, using excuses under the rhetoric of “Islamic or Arab 
authenticity.” In the context of recent developments in the Arab world, this is 
also the line often used by political Islamic movements, who embody fantasies 
about a certain past calling for a return to a “real,” “non-secular,” Islamic state. 
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I argue that these academics and proponents of political movements base their 
analyses on false assumptions, and evasions, historical and otherwise. In the 
following sections, I shall discuss some of these assumptions and arguments 
with the aim of clarifying some of their limitations, false assumptions, and 
their evasions of concrete conditions on the ground, and ignorance of a long 
history in the Arab and Muslim world that challenges the arguments about 
the origins of secular approaches to social, economic, political, and other 
aspects of our lives.
The Critique of  Secularism: Blind Spots
Among the arguments made by scholars critical of secularism is that the 
academy in the United States has been hostile to religion, and has been 
ignorant of the force of religious attachment in the lives of many members 
in the society (See, for example, Connolly 1999). Such arguments, as stated 
in the introduction, neglect several facts. One, to claim that the academy 
has been “secular” is to ignore the number of private institutions of higher 
education which are religious by their own definition. Even public universities 
are full of various religious groups and centers that serve the different religious 
communities. And there are also many academics that are religious and open 
to religion in their programs. Indeed, there are academics that are hostile to 
others who are not religious. In some academic settings, to be not religious 
impacts one’s prospects for academic jobs. So, in short, to paint a picture of a 
“secular, anti-religious campuses” is misleading and not accurate.
Furthermore, as stated in the introduction, to argue for tolerance of religious 
diversity can also lead to making the dominant religion more hegemonic 
rather than allowing for equal standing of all beliefs (religious and otherwise). 
To be “open and tolerant” to religion in the U.S. can only lead to making 
the dominant and active Zionist Christians or born-again Christians have 
a more leading presence on campuses. To be “open and tolerant” to religion 
in a dominantly Islamic society such as in Palestine, can only lead to further 
making the Islamic religious groups more dominant on our campuses. In 
a sense, tolerance in such contexts can mean exclusion of minorities and 
dominance of the majorities.
It is thus important to differentiate between minority critiques of discrimination 
and intolerance, which Edward Said (1997, 2004) and Amir Mufti (1998, 
2004), among others, undertook, and between a majority’s perception of 
discrimination as claimed by Christian Zionists in the US, Hindu right wing 
groups in India, and Islamic political groups in the Arab and Muslim worlds.
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Furthermore, we must not conflate between fighting against discrimination 
and racism in the West against Muslims, who have no political ambitions of 
taking over governments there, and Islamist groups in the Arab and Muslim 
world, who already are part of the dominant culture: clearly, what they are 
fighting for is different from Muslims’ concerns in the West. In the context 
of the Arab and Muslim world, Islamist groups who already function within 
a Muslim hegemonic structure (which includes for example a requirement 
that a head of state ought to be Muslim) aim at using religion to compete 
with existing elites deploying the language of “true Islam” to take over power/
governments, and in the process dominate the public space further. While in 
the West the issue is of tolerance and non-exclusion, in the Arab and Muslim 
worlds it is an issue of imposition and further hegemony of the public space 
and the political system.
Another important aspect of the critique of secularism is that it takes too 
lightly the analysis that secularism aimed in Europe/West at the separation of 
state and the church in order to make the church less powerful in leading or 
controlling the society and the state. The limitation of such an analysis lies in 
neglecting the historical context within Europe/West, in which secularism as 
a concept emerged in a continent that was plagued by religious wars and by 
the dominance of the church and religion The power of the church in politics 
had huge implications on individuals’ rights (including property rights, and 
rights of death and life), controlling states and societies based on religious 
texts and revelations, and religious wars that left so much deaths and damage 
to these societies.
It is true that many of these western states are still truly not completely secular. 
But, there is a qualitative difference between the past where such states were 
subject to powerful dominance of the church, and between the present, 
where the church plays a less powerful role, Generally, about issues of war 
and peace, property rights, and peoples’ life and death is not decided by a 
cleric, but by laws and regulations that are more or less transparent. Of course 
the democratic shifts in these societies can be critiqued for their limitations, 
imperfections, problems, hypocrisy, and racism against immigrants and 
marginalized groups, among other issues. But to target secularism as the main 
problem in these societies is to neglect larger questions of economic, social, 
and political implications.
In his critique of the discourse of secularism, Talal Asad, and rightly so, points 
to the misuse and abuse of the discourse of secularism in the West that has been 
often politically motivated and used as a tool for intervention in the Arab and 
42
Islamic world.3 Asad’s critique is very important for it argues against the rhetoric 
of European modern secularism, where this discourse is used to show superiority 
vis-à-vis the Muslim world, and provides a justification for intervention/
interference in the Arab/Muslim world. This applies also to other discourses 
in the West such as the discourse on democracy or women’s rights where such 
discourse have been exploited to wage wars against states and societies in the 
Arab and Muslim worlds (e.g. Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraq in 2003). 
But, to limit the critique of the role of such discourse to external interventions 
is insufficient. A more astute insight, put forward by Laura Nader, can be 
more helpful. According to Nader, a discourse of women’s rights in the Third 
World, deployed in the West from the position of superiority, has two effects; 
one external, that is intervention, and one internal, that such adiscourse 
suppresses the unequal reality of women in western societies, and limits the 
possibilities for more advances of women’s rights within the West itself.4
Another important and missing issue in the secularism debate is around the 
issue of similarity-dissimilarity. As I suggested earlier in the paper, there is 
a difference between defending minorities in the West against anti-Muslim 
racism, racism that is directed against a minority that makes no political 
claims in that context, and between the context of such debate in the Arab 
and Muslims worlds. In the latter context, the issue is about a majority in 
an already largely hegemonic Islamic context to varying degrees in different 
states, and about a phenomenon of Islamic movements making political 
claims, and their attempts at more social control.
Thus, the critique of secularism by Asad and others should not be used to 
defend repressive symbolic as well as real reactionary and dictatorial practices 
in the Arab and Muslim world, whether by states or movements. Indeed, 
some of these movements were either the creation of colonial policies or 
were adopted by Muslims as a copycat of western religious movements and 
practices, none of which is really organic, pure or authentically Islamic in 
3 Formations of  the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Stanford University Press 
2003.
4 Nader, Laura. (1989). “Orientalism, Occidentalism and the Control of  
Women”. Cultural Dynamics, Issue 2; 323.
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essence.5 To defend wearing the hijab as exhibiting women’s agency, neglects 
the religious and social pressures on many Muslim women, who continue to 
be held as a symbol of the purity of the society, and as a symbol of evil for 
patriarchal misogynist societies. And if there was a failure of secularism (of 
course ignoring the lack of secularism as such in the Arab world and the West 
alike) the answer must not be more “piety,” or religiosity.6 
Furthermore, in these studies, it is often neglected how many of these 
movements not only have been shaped by western modernity, but are a product 
of it, and often come to embody and repeat Orientalist representations of 
Arabs and Muslims as essentialized categories, frozen in time and space. It is 
in this context, that one may understand the reactionary attacks by crowds 
in Arab and Muslims countries whenever there is a cartoon, a book, or a 
film negatively depicting Islam. Such reactions and practices ought not be 
defended or justified. For those who participate in and or defend such 
reactions, the question is why there are no such reactions when Muslims’ lives 
are slaughtered in the Arab and Muslim worlds? Why is it that a text or an 
image is more important than human lives?
Rather than accusing those who are critical of both western colonialism and 
Islamic fundamentalism or even presenting them as stooges of US imperialism,7 
one is better reminded of the role that the West played in propping up Islamic 
movements in Egypt, Pakistan, Syria, and Palestine in order to suppress 
nationalist and leftist currents in the region, as well as influencing Islamists’ 
5 For example see Saba Mahmood, “Secularism, Hermeneutics, and Empire: 
The Politics of  Islamic Reformation.” Public Culture 18:2, 2006, pp.323-342. 
Also, Talal Asad. “Free Speech, Blasphemy, and Secular Criticism”, pp.20-
63 in Is Critique Secular?, published by the Townsend Center for Humanities, 
Berkeley, CA, 2009.
6 For such views see; Sadaf  Ahmad, Transforming Faith: The Story of  Al-Huda 
and Islamic Revivalism among Pakistani Women, Syracuse University Press, 2009. 
Also, Saba Mahmood, The Politics of  Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist 
Subject, Princeton University Press, 2005.
7 In addition to the other sources I refer to in this paper, see the different posts 
by Mahmood at http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/author/smahmood/
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ideology and practices.8 Today, while many Western leaders and “experts” 
participate in dehumanizing Islam, thus justifying intervention, they are also 
contributing to supporting certain ideologies and practices of Islam, as they 
did with the Islamic movements they helped empower during the Cold War 
to undermine Arab and Third World nationalism. In Egypt, for example, the 
main focus of western powers is to keep Egypt loyal to the “peace” treaty 
with Israel, and not allow “extremists” to threaten the “security” of the Israeli 
colonial state. Such is also the case with western concerns and interventions 
in the rest of the region that mainly focused on maintaing the dependency of 
the region, and the hegemony and superiority of Israel, which fits well with 
supporting political Islam, as Samir Amin (2012) argues.9
And, it is worth reminding ourselves and others that Third World nationalism was 
never secular (in the French sense of being hostile to the church or to religion); 
not in Syria, in Iraq, or in Egypt. Rather, it respected religion, yet it also was 
not ready to be run over by imperialist accomplices who wanted to use Islam 
to takeover governments, while recreating a fantasy of and about the past of an 
“authentic Islamic state” that never existed. These forces thus never challenge the 
core capitalist and neoliberal economic principles of the West. These movements, 
using Samir Amin’s term (cited earlier), are islamgiyya not Muslims, because they 
are using Islam as a tool for hegemony and control of our societies, not as a tool 
for economic, political, military, and epistemic liberation.
Bringing Back Edward Said and Secular Humanism
Furthermore, rather than critiquing Edward Said’s advocacy of secular critique 
and secular humanism as elitist, one should not forget that these critics of 
Said are part of the elite that both enjoys privileges in the West and are also 
sheltered, by their elite position, from the repressive practices of different Islamic 
movements in the Arab and Muslim worlds whose immediate victims are the 
lower/poorer classes that cannot escape the public space that is dominated 
by these conservative forces. Rather than attacking Edward Said’s secular 
humanism, it is rather important to give credit to Edward Said’s contribution 
8 Richard Dreyfuss, Devil’s Game: How the United States Helped Unleash 
Fundamentalist Islam. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2005. Gayatri 
Chakravarty Spivak, “Terror: A Speech after 9/11.” boundary 2, 31:2, 2004, 
pp.81-111.Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold 
War, and the Roots of  Terror. Doubleday, 2004.
9 Amin, Samir (2012). “The Arab revolutions: a year after.” Interface: a journal for 
and about social movements. Vol. 4, No1, May, pp. 33 – 42.
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to the study of Islam, and his critique of Western representations of Islam, 
especially in Orientalism and Covering Islam, pioneering works that need to be 
acknowledged over and over again, as a reminder for those who think that their 
discourse is new in its defense against Islamophobia in the West.
It also important to stress that critics of western secularism and anti-Muslim 
discourse in the west seem to forget the Question of Palestine that was central 
to Said’s work, and which is also central in understanding the agitations 
against Muslims in the West and elsewhere.10 None of these critics, when 
critiquing Western discourse and practices about Islam, engage in the question 
of Palestine, which is central in analyzing the issue. A campaign of fear 
against Arabs and Muslims in Europe and the West is promoted by Zionist 
intellectuals and organizations.11 One example is the linkage between the 
Danish cartoonist and Daniel Pipes and other pro-Israeli Zionists, who aim to 
frame the Palestine issue as that of Islam versus the rest or more specifically a 
religious issue,12 rather than an issue of colonialism and racism. Thus, serious 
political issues are evaded by the critics of secularism.
Thus, Said’s contribution, as well as others who are taking Said’s work seriously 
and who aim at reviving Said’s critical secularism, should not be maligned as 
promoting US imperialism, or designated as elitist,13 for their work on humanist 
criticism, is not against religion but against repression, silencing, and exclusion 
of all people regardless of their location, ethnicity, religion or gender.14Works 
such as that of Amir Mufti (1998, 2004) who advance Said’s concept of secular 
criticism as belonging to minority criticism that aims at challenging any form 
10 Matt Carr, “You are Entering Eurabia.” Race and Class, 2006, Vol. 48. N. 1.
11 Ibid
12 http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/53ceec19-7976-493a-9b0d-
922f8b3675eb?GoogleStatID=1 (Accessed on September 12, 2012. 
Also http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/4e700a0e-39b1-41be-b5d4-
de41aadc2222 (Accessed on September 12, 2012).
13 Mahmood, and Asad, cited earlier. Said’s central texts that seem to be 
neglected by these scholarly debates are: Orientalism. Vintage Books, 1979. 
Also, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest 
of  the World. Vintage Books, 1997.
14 Edward Said, Secular Criticism: The World, the Text, and the Critic, Harvard 
University Press, 1983. Also, Humanism and Democratic Criticism. Columbia 
University Press, 2004.
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of hegemony, exclusion, and repression,15 is anti-colonial at its core, for it is 
not only challenges the Euro-centric approach to the concept and practices of 
secularism, but also aims at creating a new framework for societies to live/co-
exist without any form of repression and exclusion.
Those who feel attacked by Western discourse and intervention in the 
region are justified to fight back, as many of us do, but not in a defensive 
way that blinds one to reality. This defensive approach, Ronald Judy 
argues, can contribute to collapsing Islam from a diverse faith, both in 
theory and in practice historically, to a set of rules and regulations that 
aim at making Islam singular in theory and practice,,16which fits well in 
the Western Orientalist discourse, including the Zionist discourse, about 
Islam and Muslims.
Such religious-political discourse in the name of Islam or in the defense of Islam 
is a colonial discourse, and the talk of establishing an Islamic state in Palestine, 
as elsewhere in the region, is a copycat of the Israeli Jewish colonial racist state, 
rather than a challenge to the Jewish colonial state in Palestine that was the 
creation of western imperialist power and continue to enjoy their support. 
Furthermore, while Wael Hallaq’s (2013) argument about the incompatibility 
of Islam with the state, as the state is a modern western structure that has its 
own historical development, is convincing,17 it is also true that this is the case 
with any religious state. It is not only impossible to combine Islam as a religion 
with the modern state structure, but it is also so for any religious state, because 
religion automatically excludes those who do not belong to the specific religion 
adopted by the dominant group in such a state. 
Finally, in this regard, the critique of the state’s tyranny is useful and needed. 
Yet, it doesn’t mean that we end up with both-top-down state political and 
economic tyranny, and bottom-up religious and social tyranny. Following 
such a route, we will end up being squeezed between the tyrannies of both. 
This is not the solution, but it will make the situation much worse, and 
15 Amir Mufti, “Critical Secularism: A Reintroduction for Perilous Times.” 
boundary 2, 31:2, 2004, pp. 1-9, or his “Auerbach in Istanbul: Edward Said, 
Secular Criticism and the Question of  Minority Culture,” Critical Inquiry 25:1, 
1998, pp.95-125.
16 Ronald Judy, “The threat to Islamic humanity after 11 September, 2011.” 
Critical Inquiry 45: 1-2, 2003, pp. 101-112.
17 Wael Hallaq. The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity’s Moral Predicament. 
Columbia University Press, 2013.
47
especially much worse for those who are less likely to have the means to create 
their own space, or to be mobile enough to escape the tyranny of the state, as 
elites do through their own elite local enclaves or their global mobility. 
Debating Secularism: The Contribution of  Ibn Khaldoun
There is a history of denial in the West of the contribution of Arab and Muslim 
thought, which was central to the making of the West and Europe.18 While this 
denial is central to the making of western colonial racist hegemonic modernity,19 
it is important for those who are critical of this western racist modernity not 
to fall into its traps and binaries, or to evade taking seriously Arab and Islamic 
scholarship. The arguments critical of secularism, such as those noted earlier 
in this paper which present secularism as a modern western discourse, fall into 
the western denial of the contribution of other cultures to global knowledge. 
They thus buy into the dichotomy of European/western discourse on religion 
and secularism, as if such debates were purely the invention of the West, rather 
than being part of global development of thought and critique. In the Arab/
Muslim world we have many examples of centuries of such debates; here I 
will limit myself to a brief examination of the work of Ibn Khaldoun on the 
subject, as a reminder of the history of such debates in the Arab and Muslim 
worlds that challenge these denials, binaries, and evasions.
In his discussion of the conditions for any community to survive and prosper, 
Ibn Khaldoun argues that religious texts and religious experts are not the 
source for the study of human history and its development, nor a source for 
decision making on social, economic, or political questions. These issues are 
of any society’s concern, and rather must be tackled by rational thought . 
While allowing room for faith, scholars, according to Ibn Khaldoun must 
use their critical faculties to rationally tackle social, economic and political 
questions regarding humans’ needs and conditions for survival and prosperity.
While a believer in Islam, Ibn Khaldoun based his argument on religious, 
historical, and material facts and argued that religion/faith is not the central 
issue for community’s survival and prosperity, due to at least two important 
points. One reason is that since other cultures in the region before the coming 
18 Jonathan Lyons, The House of Wisdom: How the Arabs Transformed Western 
Civilization, London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2009, and Gerard Delanty, 
Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, and Reality. Palgrave Macmillan, 1995.
19 As argued in the different works of  Enrique Dussel, Walter Mignolo, among 
others such as Jonathan Lyon, cited earlier.
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of Islam managed to develop sophisticated social organizations (Egyptians, 
Mesopotamian, and other cultures), and since other groups in Ibn Khaldoun’s 
time, belonging to other religions, including those who are in what we call today 
Asia, and whose numbers are much larger than Muslim, have managed to sustain 
continuous existence, survive, prosper, and develop sophisticated cultures, and 
since these societies do not belong to the so called monolithic religions nor 
specifically to Islam, than, his argument follows, religion and faith, in this case 
Islam, is not the primary condition for groups’ survival and prosperity.
Ibn Khaldoun further argues, that even if one wishes to claim that religion/
faith/Islam is the defining principle of how we ought to run the affairs of 
our societies, humans, including scholars, cannot do that because all believers 
admit that only God is all knowing, and his words revealed to the prophets 
cannot be understood by common human faculties. If there are some who 
have special abilities to communicate with God directly and know the 
meaning of his words, these are only the prophets, and there are not any 
longer prophets to know/interpret the Qur’an and directives from God on 
how to run the state. In his view, prophets are rare t, and since we are not 
prophets, we must look for our own rational human faculties to find solutions 
for our daily affairs, questions, and or problems.
Ibn Khaldoun argues further, that even those who assume they know 
what the Qur’an exactly says might be wrong, because there is a difference 
between a thought, and expressing that thought in speech or in writing, and 
the difficulty of how a listener or a reader might perceive the real meaning of 
that thought/idea expressed in speech or in a text. In other words, texts, the 
Qur’an included, cannot be understood by reading them in the same way 
they were intended or expressed by God and delivered to the community 
by the prophet, and each person/believer will have a difficulty in making 
his/her understanding a uniform one for others to follow. This is why, in 
addition to other reasons, there are many schools in each religion believing 
in the same text/God. 
As a result of both arguments presented above, Ibn Khaldoun argues, rather than 
religious texts and religious experts, rational critical human mental faculties 
are needed to dealing with social, economic, and political conditions that are 
central to the survival and prosperity of the community, any community.
Rather than piety, or faith, according to Ibn Khaldoun, there are several 
conditions that are necessary for human societies to exist, survive and prosper. 
First, and here is the starting point, humans by nature are political. To survive 
and prosper, individuals need to exist in a community/collective for self-
49
protection and food. For that community to survive and prosper, there are 
several conditions but religion is not a necessary condition, although religion/
faith/spirituality must not be excluded. 
These conditions are many; including a reasonable governing system that treats 
the subjects of its rule with dignity and equality. Unjust and harsh governance 
leads to the alienation of the members of that society, resentments, and finally 
the system’s downfall. Just societies must also treat the labor (mental and 
physical) of each individual justly, for if one’s labor is abused, it leads to the 
laborer being discouraged and the collective would be under threat without 
the input of each individual member in it. To achieve and maintain a stable 
society that can survive and develop, attention must also be paid to education, 
for education is crucial to the development of mental and physical skills of 
individual members in the society. Also important is to guarantee personal 
and public health, as well as city planning that makes living possible and 
sustainable, for all these issues affect the ability of each individual to survive, 
develop, and contribute to the collective’s survival and development. As the 
group/collective is best understood as a circle, once a link in it is broken, 
the circle ceases to exist. The political, social, economic, and philosophical 
analyses offered by Ibn Khaldoun point to the need for justice, equality, and 
solidarity, so that any human can live in dignity, without which one cannot be 
human, and without which not only the individual collapses, but the group/
collective (the sum of individuals) collapses as well.
A consideration of Ibn Khaldoun’s work, as well as other thinkers in Arab,Islamic 
and global history, exposes the fallacies of western modernity about the origin 
of rationality and secularism, and can also help us broaden these concepts in 
order not to fall into the trap of binaries of rational versus-non-rational, or 
secular-non-secular, or even the myth of origins. What if the critics of secularism 
discussed in this paper take into account the argument presented by Ibn 
Khaldoun here? What if political Islamic groups in the region take into account 
the knowledge and heritage of thought that Islamic societies produced such as 
that of Ibn Khaldoun? How much sense would the argument of both (scholars 
critical of secularism and Islamic political activists on the ground) make after 
taking into consideration Ibn Khaldoun’s ideas? Would they still be relevant?
Conclusion
I have tried to discuss the arguments made by critics of secularism and show 
their limitations. The arguments by these critics, as I have demonstrated, are 
based on false assumptions, evasions, and binaries that obscure historical 
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realities of societies in the West ,as well as those in the Arab and Muslim 
world. Their critiques of secularism are also used to defend reactionary 
practices and groups in the Arab and Muslim worlds, and finally as a tool 
to in the arsenal of those who call for Islamic states in the region.
Regardless of the issue of whether there was ever an Islamic state, or 
whether Islam or any other religion can fit with the structure/concept of 
the state, the issue today is whether religious doctrine should be imposed 
on any state foundation or structure,, In our region the issue is about 
Islam, and whether Palestinians, should support such an approach.
While in the past if a person or a group of people were not happy with a 
certain theological doctrine imposed by a ruler, the person or group was 
often able to change their place of residence with much more ease than 
today, and live somewhere else where they are more dignified, content or 
happy. Today, within the framework of the nation state that dominates the 
world system, and the only possible/available one to us at the moment, 
one cannot easily cross borders and change residence, and Palestinians 
must be more attuned to this issue than anyone else, sincee Israeli settler 
colonial rule since 1948 has made most refugees, and the rest under a 
system of repression, and restriction. This Palestinian experience should 
an important factor in the way Palestinians envision a possible future state 
that does not duplicate the racist Jewish state’s ideology and or practices.
Again, one should emphasize here that much of the discourse about Islam 
in the West obscures the issue of Palestine, including that of critics of the 
discourse of secularism. This is because the Palestine question is not a 
religious question, but a question of dignity, equality, and justice. 
Furthermore, regarding the question of Palestine and western discourse 
of secularism, we also need to keep in mind how the West continues to 
support Israel despite Israel’s religious nature as a state and society, built on 
a supremacist Jewish world-view, and supremacist racist practices against 
Christian and Muslim Palestinians since before its inception in 1948, 
continuing this day. Here again, Palestine can be a test for the rhetoric 
of justice, human rights, dignity, and secularism and tolerance. But the 
opposition to Jewish racist supremacy in Palestine must also include an 
opposition to any other supremacy. One should not mirror and replicate 
western rigidity and intolerance, especially that Arabs and Muslims pride 
themselves ona civilization/culture with a long history of tolerance. But 
that the past might have been tolerant compared to the other histories of 
other monolithic religions where difference was not accepted, one cannot 
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ignore the historical developments of human societies. What was accepted 
in the past, and even favored as relatively tolerant governance, cannot be 
duplicated today, where the equality of all groups and individuals must be 
the norm and the goal, and no hierarchy of existence can be tolerat.d as 
was the case in the past.
Another important issue in my “critique of the critique” of secularism is 
that these critics of secularism have assumed that this discussion was purely 
an European/Western invention, ignoring the history of the discussions of 
such issues in the Arab/Islamic history. As Enrique Dussel, among others, 
argues .much of western modernity’s claims of new knowledge are in 
fact not new but emerge from, or can also be found in, Arab and Islamic 
sources, as well as in the contributions of many other cultures. We thus 
need to re-conceptualize knowledge to include non-Western philosophy 
and thought in order to reshape knowledge about ourselves, for us, and for 
others, and where knowledge must aim at liberation, dignity, equality, and 
the well-being of all members of our societies, not the few.20
The aim of the paper is also, in part, to critique what has become known as 
political Islam in our region, that aims at organizing our societies socially 
and politically according to an interpretive fantasy about an Islamic state 
in the past, to which we must return in order to ‘develop,’ and even become 
a global dominant force, and requiring that we return to some original text 
or religion in its pure form. 
In the current context, we are speaking in light of developing events in 
the region, and the growing and dominant discourse of religion, especially 
the argument about the lack of contradiction between religion/Islam and 
the state at this time of human history, and in light of the revolutions and 
changes in the region, Here we see that what is called political Islam has 
managed to partly coopt these revolutions/changes after it collaborated 
and lived with colonization and dictatorships.
In such arguments, both the past and the present is misrepresented, and 
hence a better future is not possible, for only if we study the past without 
silencing many aspects of it, and if we study the causes of current problems, 
can we learn where to look for a better future. As for the imagined past, 
it is correct to argue that there was never an Islamic state in the modern 
20 Enrique Dussel. Philosophy of Liberation. New York: Wiqf  & Stick Publisher, 
2003. Also, The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of “the Other” and the Myth of 
Modernity. Continuum International Publishing Group, 1995.
52
sense of the state. In these arguments in the present, the reasons for the 
current situation in the Arab world, which are political, economic, social, 
and epistemological/intellectual are absent. Also unacknowledged is the 
divisiveness in each society in the region, societies that are also plagued by 
racism and exclusion. 
As for the future, is it something that will never be if we continue to be 
trapped by these binaries, illusions, and evasions; because the reasons 
for our current miserable situation is not found in religion or religious 
texts but rather, as Ibn Khaldoun argued, in social, economic, and 
political conditions, and this future cannot be realized by coercion, 
exclusion or repression, whether exercised by colonial and neocolonial 
structures, authoritarian rule or represented in fundamentalist 
reactionary Islamic discourse.
It is also important to stress that there is a binary in western modernist 
thought that leaves no room for the non-material world. Thinking 
through Ibn Khaldoun, among many other Arab and Islamic thinkers as 
well as among many contemporary thinkers worldwide who are critical 
of western modernity, we find that they did not fall into the trap of the 
binary between the material and non-material, and thus offer a way out 
of the materialist repressive western capitalist structure. In Ibn Khaldoun’s 
view, humans are concerned with both their material and spiritual 
needs, and desires. These cannot be satisfied only through mechanical 
formulas for “progress,” which is a term he does not specifically use, but 
by necessary material things to live on and to enjoy, as well as meeting 
needs in spirituality or the non-material sphere (psychological). But in the 
long run, in order to maintain and develop any society, political, social, 
economic, and environmental issues must be the core of our analysis, as 
explained earlier. Ibn Khaldoun is anything but a naïve humanist thinker; 
he, like many others, stresses moderation, and warns against extremes that 
will bring the dialectic of forces, the negations, to the point of collapse. 
Justice for him is not necessarily an absolute category, but some measure 
of justice is needed for any human to survive and produce. 
By drawing on Ibn Khaldoun I attempt here to show that we had many 
pasts from which we can draw inspirations and ideas, that we can and 
need to develop further to fit our historical time. History is not static, and 
must always develop in a way that makes more room for people, and in 
which we work to making our lives more just for everyone. Finally, one is 
not against religion as such, but against the use of religion in the modern 
political context of states and societies in a way that cannot but exclude, 
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and produce inequality not only between one religion and another, but 
also between good Muslims and bad Muslims, This can only lead to the 
exclusion of the self in the end, and the destruction of the collective. Islam, 
and other religions, could serve us in ideas and concepts about justice, 
equality, and freedom, along with other humanistic perspectives.
As Palestinians, we must, while opposing Jewish supremacy in Palestine, 
also oppose any supremacy and exclusionary systems anywhere, and not 
replace it here in Palestine with Islamic or any other supremacy. Such 
a system, no matter who is in power cannot be defended ethically or 
religiously. It is a system that is built on oppression and injustice, and 
cannot be sustained in the long run.
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The Arabs before Islam: A 
Refutation of a Prevailing 
Perception
Jamal Daher
Translated and Edited by
Abdul-Karim Barghouti and Nadim Mseis
This study critically examines the dominant trend of past and contemporary 
Arab research on Arabs before Islam. The aim is to show the impact of scholars’ 
preconceptions on their research and on consolidating a prevalent conception 
of Arabs. This conception is based on the assumption that Arabs were capable 
neither of producing thought nor of engaging in any philosophical abstraction. 
Our study, therefore, aims, to show the contradictions between the theoretical 
frameworks utilized by these researchers, and their explanations for what they 
discover and find about Arabs. Moreover our study endeavors to demonstrate 
not only the richness of the Arabic language and its subsequent capacity to serve 
as an epistemological tool capable of describing the early Arabs’ understanding 
of nature and of the necessary survival skills for life in the desert, but also their 
ability to accurately interpret their social and cultural life.
Introduction
In this paper Arabs are defined as those who lived in Arabia before the rise of 
Islam although we intend to examine opinions that addressed Arabs in general, 
both before and after the rise of Islam. This broad view will shed light on how 
even the most thoughtful of researchers dealt with historical data on Arabs that 
proved to be incompatible with their thoughts and beliefs. Our intention is 
to show how historical data, regardless of its nature and degree, failed to alter 
these researchers’ presumptions about Arabs in the pre-Islamic ‘Jahiliyya’ period 
who, they insist, had nothing of any scientific nature to be proud of except 
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their “linguistics, their language provisions and the writing of speeches”1 Such 
presumptions were supported by the most thorough of researchers such as 
Tarabishi who asserted that “despite some information about books that were 
in circulation amongst pre-Islamic Arabs, we must state that the only prose 
that was known amongst the Arabs of the ‘Jahiliyya’ period was the writing 
of aphorisms and maxims, and the rhymed prose of Kahan which is close 
in its structure to poetry”2. The results of studies on Arabs were therefore in 
harmony with these ideas, and to be precise these a priori judgments constitute 
one of the main factors determining researchers’ understanding, analysis, and 
interpretation of available historical evidence on Arabs. This subsequently 
deepened the researchers’ a priori judgments on Arabs and in turn confirmed 
the assumption that the intellectual sources of Arab-Islamic philosophy had 
nothing to do with Arabs but were Greek in origin and root.
Such an approach to study Arabs is not an exception3. But what is striking 
here is the exceptionalism of such an approach, whichexcludes Arabs from any 
theoretical explanations deployed in studying other peoples. Even worse, some 
scholars and researchers went so far as to suggest that Arabs do not constitute a 
people. Al-Shahrastani, for instance, who lived in the fifth century AH, insisted 
that God has not granted Arabs anything from the scienceof philosophy, “nor 
has He prepared them to take care of philosophy or think philosophically”4. 
It is important to note here that if it were not for the prevalence of such a 
priori ideas on Arabs, their characteristics and ways of thinking would have 
become known a long time ago. We mean to say that these a priori judgments, 
1 Al-Jabiri, Momammad ‘Abed, The Formation of  Arab Reason (in Arabic), 
Beirut, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies and the Group for Arab 
Studies, and History and Society, 1991, p. 88. 
2 Tarabishi, George, The Critique of  the Critique of  Arab Reason, the 
Problematic of  Arab Reason (in Arabic), Beirut, Al-Saqi Books, 1998, p. 180. 
3 This is an issue that Thomas Kuhn discusses in his book The Structure of  
Scientific Revolution, 1962 where he makes reference to the impact of  the 
size of  the belief  of  scientists of  a specific scientific theory, not only on 
their understanding of  the results of  their researches, but on the scientific 
experiment in its entirety. Look also at Thomus Kuhn, “Logic of  Discovery 
or Psychology of  Research” in Criticism and the Growth of  Knowledge, 
Edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), pp.1-23. 
4 Al-Shahrastani, Abe al-Fath ‘Abd -Alkarim Ibn Abe Bakr. al-Milal wal Nihal, 
edited by Mohammad al-Wakeel, Cairo, al-Halabi Institute, 1968, p.1 and p. 10
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constituted, and still continue to constitute one of the more important reasons 
behind the continued ignorance of what Arabs were capable of scientifically and 
intellectually and the spread of knowledge among Arabs before the rise of Islam.
Hence, the main theoretical assumption of our research is that Arabs are like 
other peoples and what can be applied to the study of others can be applied to 
them. We do not however mean by this that either Arabs or other peoples do 
not have their own particular idiosyncrasies. What we mean is that theories, in 
the various ways they have applied to other peoples, are also applicable to Arabs. 
So if it is possible to adopt theories that connect living conditions and human 
activity to explain the behavior and knowledge of other peoples, then it should 
be possible to use the same theories to explain the behavior and knowledge of 
Arabs. And if the maturity of thought and the breadth of knowledge among 
peoples are associated with the maturity of their language, then that should also 
be true with regards to Arabs.
The Boundaries of  the Position
The belief in the ignorance of Arabs, especially the naivety of the Bedouin, 
constitutes the starting point of a deep-rooted certainty for most researchers, 
including Arab researchers, especially when it comes to studying Arabs before 
the rise of Islam. Ignorance and naivety are considered to be the attributes of 
Bedouin Arabs, or the ignorance and naivety of Arabs is attributed to Bedouin 
ignorance and naivety. So while, on one hand, ignorance and naivety were 
attributed to Arab nomadism (al-Badawa al-‘Arabiyya), on the other hand, the 
ignorance and naivety of Arabs were used as a basis for judging Arabs. Some 
researchers went so far to pass the judgment that “the main general cultural 
features characteristic of what can be named or called (Arab mentality) are 
features, no matter how different the judgments and opinions on these features 
are, that can be characterized in the last analysis as: a pragmatic culture void of 
any deep theoretical and philosophical tendency and does not in consequence 
accept the idea of overlapping and intermingling between the Gods and 
humans”5. Zeidan makes such a statement without giving an explanation that is 
consistent with the size and seriousness of such a judgment, as if the indication 
of pragmatic thinking among Arabs is enough to deny their ability to be creative 
and innovative and to be able to engage deeply in philosophical theorization. 
In contrast, Israel Wolfson states, for instance, that the Canaanites, because 
of their material mentality and earthly focus, invented what they invented and 
5 Zeidan, Yusef, Arab Theology and the Origins of  Religious Violence (in 
Arabic), Cairo, al-Shurouq Publishing House, 2010, p. 87. 
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created what they created. They were the ones who “invented the ship and found 
ways to make glass and set-up the system of arithmetic. They were the ones who 
invented the reduced alphabet of writing that was made up of cuneiform and 
hieroglyph symbols. So no wonder that the Canaanite inscription or writing 
has become the basis for the development of all inscriptions in the civilized 
world in the East and West”6. In fact the Canaanites and Phonecians, with their 
material mentality, are attributed with the invention of “purple as a color as well 
as atomic theories”7. Even more than that if we accept the opinion of Glazer, 
as cited by Wolfson, that the term “Ma’in Misran”, which was mentioned in 
“Egyptian writings, refers to Ma’inite Butoun (sections of a tribe) that were 
found in Egypt and were expelled out of it…and that these Ma’in tribes were 
themselves the Semitic tribes which conquered Egypt and ruled it for centuries 
and were known thereafter as the Chaso or the Hyksos”8, these tribes, which 
were one of the greatest Arab tribes “that ruled some of the countries located in 
the Northern part of the Arabian peninsula for a long period of time”9, would 
then be the ones which introduced the chariot and the sword to Egypt and also 
introduced the alphabet to the Greeks, something which Bernal believes must 
have taken place prior to 1400 BC10.
As for the claim of their refusal to accept the idea of overlapping and 
intermingling between the gods and the humans, al-Ma’rri states in his letter 
that the Arabs did not “during the Jahiliyya period venture into these great 
mistakes and those issues that were erroneous, but their minds tended to follow 
or adopt the opinions of the wise and those books written by their predecessors, 
especially given that most philosophers did not believe in any prophet and they 
thus used to consider those who believed in any one to be an idiot”11. That is, 
the lack of belief of Arabs in the idea of prophecy or the idea of intermingling 
6 Wolfson, Israel, The History of  Semitic Languages (in Arabic), Beirut, al-
Qalam Publishing House, 1980, p. 52. 
7 Maisel, John, The History of  Phoenician and Canaanite Civilization 
(translated to Arabic by Ruba al-Khash, al-Ladhiqiyya, al-Hiwar Publishing 
House, p. 17.
8 Wolfson, Israel, p. 176. 
9 Ibid. p.177. 
10 Bernal, Martin, Black Athena (in Arabic), Edited by Ahmad Othman, Cairo, 
The Higher Council for Culture, 2002, p. 190.
11 Al-Ma’rri, Abi al-‘Ala’, Letter of  Forgiveness (Risalat-al-Ghoufran), edited by 
‘Aisha ‘Abd al-Rahman (Bint al-Shate’), Cairo, Dar al-Ma’aref, Taa 9, 440.
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and overlapping between the gods and humans stems, in their opinion, from the 
fact that the idea in itself is ridiculous. With such an opinion, they were similar 
to many pagans to whom Christianity seemed as “a barbaric ideology and the 
Christian God to be harmful or primitive who intervenes in an irrational way in 
human affairs, and that there is nothing in the Christian God which is common 
to the God of philosophers who is not subject to change and who is distant as 
the God of Aristotle”12.
Yousef Zeidan’s assumption of the ignorance and naivety of Arabs is not 
an exception, nor is his willingness to judge them without backing up such 
judgment with evidence, despite the fact that there are enough sources that 
show that his judgment is unsound and thus incorrect. Furthermore, even if 
many sources used in his field seem to suggest conclusions different from his 
position and opinions, for him all such sources are without any value and thus 
there is no need to agree with them or even to assume that they really exist. 
Another example of such an approach is that of ‘Azzeh Hassan, who states, 
in his introduction to Ibn al-Ajdabi’s book, without any attempt on his part 
to back up his argument, that “the knowledge of Arabs during the Jahiliyya 
period about the subject of al-Azmina wal-Anwaa (the stars, when they are in 
a state of gradual disappearance) was a pragmatic knowledge, and was based 
on continuous experimentation and observation throughout the years and was 
not a result of any rational induction or scientific research because they were 
ignorant of mathematics and geometry”13. 
Al-Jahiz mentions a story narrated by al-Yaqtari, about an Arab Bedouin 
who was describing “to a group of inhabitants in the city, al-Anwaa and al-
Ihtida’ stars and the stars of the hours of the night and al-Su’oud (stars that 
bring happiness) wal-Nuhous (and stars that bring bad luck). A man said to 
an ‘Abadi Sheikh (an ‘Abadi inhabitant) who was present : “don’t you see how 
knowledgeable this nomadic Arab is of the stars which we really don’t know 
enough about! He answered: Woe unto your mother, who wouldn’t know the 
branches of his house?”14
12 Armstrong, Karen, God and the Human Being over 4000 years from 
Ibrahim al-Khalil until the Current Age, translated by Muhammad al-Jiwara, 
Damascus, Dar al-Hasad, 1996, 104.
13 In: “‘Azzeh, Hassan, Ibn al-Ajjdabi, Abi Ishaq Ibrahim Ibn Ismail, al-Azmina 
and al-Anwaa, edited by ‘Azzeh, Hassan, Dar Abi Raqraq, 2006, p.11. 
14 Al-Jahiz, Abi Othman ‘Amro Bin Bahr, Al-Haywan (the Animal), edited by 
“Abd al-Salam Haron, 2nd Edition, vol.6, Cairo, Mustafa al-Babi Al-Halabi 
Publishing House, p. 31. 
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In order to be able to examine the extent to which the description given by 
al-Sheikh al-‘Abadi of the Arab Bedouin’s relationship to and knowledge of 
the stars was accurate, it is necessary to look at the other areas of knowledge 
of Arab Bedouins, especially those that have to do with the natural world, 
including the stars.
Arabs not only distinguished between the four seasons, as four conditions 
that nature passes through during its cycle, but also divided every one of the 
four seasons into periods in accordance with various conditions. “Each time-
period was named by the name of the type of rain that fell during that time. 
So that the first three time-periods of winter is named al-Wasmi, then the 
winter, then the spring and all are winter. And the first time-periods of the 
summer were named al-Sayf (with shad-da on the yaa), then al-hamim, then 
the fall and all are Sayf (summer)”15. They even made a distinction between 
the conditions of rain and their characteristics, starting systematically with 
weak rain and then going through all other types of rain16. The months of 
the year came to refer to what characterizes nature in each period of that 
season, and they then distinguished between ten weather conditions within 
the month, which means that the fractionalization of the year into its various 
components matched the natural conditions at different times.
Accordingly, and in the context of the linguistic activity of the Arabs, we need 
to understand the immobility or stability of the months in the year before 
the rise of Islam, where the Nasee’ (the act of delaying the start of the year) 
was implemented to maintain their stability and seasonal times in relation to 
the conditions of nature. Thus, the names of the months were connected to 
the natural conditions in every month of the year. Accordingly, “their winter 
would begin in Jamadi the first and Jamadi the last. Water would freeze during 
these two months and that was the reason why they gave them these names”17. 
Their summer would start during Ramadan, due to extreme heat during this 
period of the year. Arabs not only set forth in detail the weather conditions 
15 Ibn al-Ajdabi, Al-Azmina wal-Anwaa, p.95. 
16 There is no need here to list the names of  rain, and they are 29, in addition 
to the weak types of  rain (look at al-Tha’labi, Abi Mansour ‘Abd al-Malik Bin 
Mohammad, Fiqh al-Lugha wa Asrar al-‘Arabiya (The Jurisprudence of  Law 
and the Secrets of  Arabic), edited by Yaseen al-Ayyoubi, Beirut, al-Maktaba 
al-‘Asriyya, 2000, p. 303). It’s enough to indicate here to the Arabs knowledge 
activity in everything that had to do with al-Anwaa and Al-Azmina. 
17 Al-Asfahani, Abi al-Qasem al-Hasan Bin Mohammad, Al-Azmina wal-
Amkina, Haidar Abad, Dar al-Ma’aref, 1332, AH, vol.1, p. 86. 
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of each month, but, in addition to these names, there were other names for 
Arab months, like for instance al-Mu’tamir (meaning ordering), wal-Najer wa-
Khawwan and they all refer to either the weather conditions or to the activities 
to be carried in every month. So al-Mu’tamir “means to order everything which 
the year brings and needs to be accomplished”18. And they would name “the 
two months of winter the months of Qammah … because the camels would 
raise their heads when they were close to the water due to the severity of its 
coldness and so al-Ibl al Qimah (the camels raising their heads)… and they 
would give the name for the months of Qaith, due to the severity of heat, the 
months of Najer. And this is due to the fact that the camels would drink, and 
they could hardly quench their thirst. So al-Najr and al-Baghr are converging, 
and this means to drink but without quenching one’s thirst”19.
Additionally, every three nights had a special name. “So the first three were 
given the name: Gharar, and the second three: Nafal, for the Gharar is the 
origin and Nafal was just an addition. The third three: Bouhron, where the 
moon light is predominant in comparison to that of the stars, and the fourth 
were Zouhron due to their whiteness, and the fifth Beedon (white) due to the 
fact that the moon appears from the beginning till the end of the night. The 
sixth set of three was called Dura’on due to the predominance of blackness 
in the beginning of the night and to its whiteness thereafter, the seventh 
was called Thulmun due to the prevalence of complete darkness, the eighth 
Hanadisu due to the intensity of their blackness, the ninth Mihaqun due to 
brightness of the crescent, and the tenth al-Da’da’, meaning the intensity of 
darkness, where the moon would be completely hidden for a night or two so 
it couldn’t be seen in the early morning or in the evening. Finally, the twenty 
eighth night is named al-Da’jaa, and the twenty ninth al-Dahma’ and the 
thirtieth al-Laylaa. Together this final set of three was called al-Da’da”20.
The fractionalization of the year to its components, the categorization of 
natural changes and the distinction between the natural cycles, were some 
of the methods Arabs used to relate to the desert so as to be in control of 
their lives. The Arab’s seasons, for instance, “such as the pilgrimage season 
and that of the big markets were facets of civilization in the age of Jahiliyya. 
It was not enough for the time periods of seasons to be known, including 
18 Al-Bayrouni, Abi al-Rihan Mohammad Bin Ahmad, Al-Athar al-Baqiyya Min 
al-Quroun al-Khaliya, Cairo, Maktabat al-Thaqafa al-Diniyya, 2008, p. 60.
19 Ibn Qutaiba, Abi Mohammad Abdullah Bin Muslim, 276, AH, al-Anwaa fi 
Mawasem al-Arab, Baghdad, al-Shuun al-Thaqafiyya Al-‘Amat, 1998, pp.109-110. 
20 Ibn al-Ajdabi, Azmina wal Anwaa, p.85 and p. 87. 
64
the days when they began and ended, but it was also necessary to set steady 
units of measurement that did not rotate in time like the rotation of the 
months of the lunar year, which sometimes occurred in the winter, at times 
in the summer, sometimes in the spring, and at other times in the fall… 
The Arabs during the Jahiliyya used to have more days inserted ‘intercalary’, 
so as to set fixed times for their seasons. They called these days ‘al-Nasee’, 
meaning delaying”21
The categorization and distinction of the conditions of life in accordance to the 
conditions of nature and the act of giving these categories names was a way of 
linking nature with social behavior. It was, in fact, an act of taking nature into 
the social-spatial space in order to ensure the Arabs’ ability to be in control of 
their lives. They used language to do all of this, a process that wouldn’t have 
been possible if language hadn’t reached the proper stage of maturity.
If language, as Jerar Jihami says, is: “an active principle that imposes on thought 
a number of various distinctions and subjective values, and this what converts 
the system of each language to a diverse repository of inherited experiences of 
successive generations”22, then the act of naming, being part of the activity of 
language, should thus be part of such repository. Describing naming this way 
reveals its connection to the inherited experiences of successive generations 
and to the nature of the relationship between the producers of language 
and their environment. But naming is also an activity which is indicative 
of the limits and nature of the Arabs’ knowledge of their environment. The 
act of naming, as an act of abstraction, is an act of distinction which makes 
something what it is and separates it from the other. Namely it is an act of 
categorization of beings and phenomena and a way to distinguish between 
them and thus the act is indicative of the nature of cognition and the type of 
knowledge. By this we can say that as the abstractions of language multiply 
and are able to categorize and account for a larger and larger number of beings 
and phenomena, then the knowledge of nature also reaches a mature state of 
development. Also, as names multiply, like for instance the multiple names 
Arabs have for rain, knowledge becomes deeper and clearer. When naming 
multiplies and increases, the transmission of information, becomes easier and 
faster. The descriptive transmission of information technically needs a larger 
21 Hamour, Urfan Mohammad, Seasons and the Calculation of  Time amongst 
the Arabs before Islam (in Arabic), Beirut, Muassat al-Rihab al-Haditha, 
2000, pp. 9-10. 
22 Jihami, Jerar, The Linguistic Problematic in Arab Philosophy, Beirut, al-
Maktabeh al-Phalsaphia, 1986, p. 1.
65
number of words and more descriptive expressions. And as the transmission 
of information becomes easier, the possibility of its dissemination and 
accumulation becomes greater.
So, looking at the periods before and after the rise of Islam, as far as language is 
concerned, we can say that the roots of this naming activity can be attributed to 
the pre-Islamic Arabs. What is implied here is not what al-Farabi meant in his 
statement that “the populace and the masses preceded those who had specific 
specializations, and the common knowledge which was representative of the 
opinions of all preceded in time the practical industry and the knowledge 
which has a specific relationship with these industries, and all of these are 
public knowledge.”23 Instead, language itself was the project of the Arabs and 
one of their overriding obsessions before the arrival of Islam. The same was 
with their pursuit of knowledge.
The Elusiveness of  Language
“Every meaning for al-‘Ajam (the foreign), is a result of deep thought and 
diligent opinion and extended seclusion and consultation and cooperation, 
and also the result of prolonged thinking and the study of books, and the 
story of the second is the knowledge of the first, and the addition of the third 
is the knowledge of the second, until the fruits of that thought culminated 
with the last. While everything for Arabs is but the result of intuition and 
improvisation, as if it is an inspiration, and as such they have no difficulty 
or endurance in producing thought nor do they need to think long or beg 
for help for their thoughts… for they are able and capable of being eloquent 
and of occupying a lofty position in rhetoric, and their orators can deliver 
wonderful speeches for their words come easy and in convenience… ” 24
Al-Jabiri interprets this quote by stating that al-Jahiz, though not being 
careful, takes away from Arabs “the ability to be rational” meaning the ability 
to infer and to use reason in making judgments. According to al-Jahiz, the 
principal constituent of “the Arab mind” is intuition and improvisation, and 
by this he means that the Arab is quick in “understanding” things and not 
hesitant in making judgments. It follows that the normative view sees Arabs 
23 Al-Farabi, Abu Nasr, Al-Hurouf  (Characters), edited by Muhsin Mahdi, 
Beirut, Dar-Al-Shourok, 1986, p. 134. 
24 Al-Jahiz, Abu Uthman Amr ibn Bahr al-Kinani al-Basri, Al-Bayan wal-Tabyeen 
(Eloquence and Demonstration), corroborated by ‘Abd Al-Salam Haron, 
Cairo, Al-Khaniji Bookstore, 1998, vol. 3, p. 28.
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as having instantaneous reactions to their surroundings, in contrast to the 
objective view which is based on “suffering, endurance and contemplation”. 
In other words, it is the suffering, endurance and contemplation of reason in 
its pursuit of knowledge. According to al-Jahiz, these tenets of “reason” are 
found only amongst al-‘Ajam (non-Arabs or foreigners) such as the Persians 
and the Greeks”]25
Before we examine Al-Jabiri’s interpretation of Al-Jahiz’ position, we need to 
clarify the meaning of “Fitra” (innate) and “Badaha”(intuition) in the Arabic 
language so as to make clear whether Al-Jahiz really belittles or takes away from 
Arabs their ability to rationalize, though without intending to do so.
Fitra bil-kasra (the vowel kasr below the letter fa), is what God has given 
to his creatures from His knowledge and it means initiation and invention. 
And fatara bil-fatha (the vowel fatha on the top of the letter fa) means to 
crack a thing and tafatara means cracking or breaking something. (Lisan al-
‘Arab, “Fa, Tah, Raa). Each of the two above meanings reinforces the other. 
Cracking means the cracking of something in itself into two parts, and if 
language for the Arabs comes by fitra (i.e. it is innate), then language is its 
other part (the other part of innate, or fitra). But what fitra bil-kasra means 
is that language for Arabs, is succinct in expression and eloquent, and it 
begins with the Arab and it is his own invention. If we look at the meaning 
of badaha (intuition), we will find that its meaning is not that different 
from the second meaning of fitra (innate) which is the first of everything 
and it is what emanates from it (Lisan al-‘Arab, Ba, Dal, Ha). Based on this 
understanding, Al-Jahiz expressed his position towards the relationship of 
Arabs with language, which in turn means that Al-Jabiri’s interpretation 
of Al-Jahiz’ opinion of Arabs and their utilization of their language to be a 
negation of their ability to rationalize, entails projecting and imposing on 
Al-Jahiz’ text that which cannot possibly be a part of it. This means that it 
is an interpretation that relies on al-Jabiri’s preference for reason over al-
badaha wal-fitra (intuition and innate).
When Al-Jahiz compares between the relationship of the Arab and Al-‘Ajami 
(the Persian and the Greek) to language, he does not favor or prefer reason 
over al-Badaha, even though we may feel the existence of admiration and 
appreciation on his part of the relationship of the Arab with his linguistic 
activity, but he talks about two different paths, and in fact about two different 
faculties used for this same activity; the Arabs use fitra and badaha while 
Al-‘Ajami (the Persian and the Greek) use hard work and endurance. This 
25 Al-Jabiri, Muhammad ‘Abed, The Formation of  Arab Reason (in Arabic), p.32
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subsequently means that Al-Jahiz did not negate, and it is not possible for us 
to conclude from his words that Arabs did not or could not use their reason 
(mind) in the production of language. Instead he argues that they were not in 
need of much effort, endurance and hard work to conduct this type of activity.
So if Arabs were already successfully developing a rich language, why should 
they then relate to it in a different way, in a way where they should exert 
more much effort and engage in hard work? Or should the Arabs have taken 
the paths of the Greeks, regardless of their success, in order to have the 
recognition and appreciation they deserved for their intellectual activity and 
language production?
We need here to make reference to the fact that al-Jabiri’s association of 
subjectivity with al-Badaha and Fitra, and his association of objectivity with 
reason, which he argues comes from hard work, real effort, and endurance, 
lacks distinction, comparison, and scientific caution. Thus, not every activity 
of reason can be described as objective, even though it involves a lot of effort, 
hard work, and endurance. And when we talk about the production of 
language by itself, there is no place to discuss the objectivity of reason, due 
to the fact that objectivity is associated with the discussion of truth. Thus Al-
Kindi, following Aristotle26, defines truthfulness as “the positive statement of 
what is and the negative statement of what is not; and it is also either to prove 
what a thing is not or to negate a thing of a thing that is for it”27
That is to say that objectivity as a concept has to do with the relationship 
of language with reality, after its production and formulation, and does not 
come as a result of the process of production and formulation. And if the 
discussion is about the production of literature, regardless of its nature, then 
objectivity has no relationship with language even after its production and 
formulation for the mere fact that a definitive statement, as Al-Farabi states, 
is “when a judgment is passed or made on a statement, it will be truthful or 
untruthful in its structure and in in itself and not by mere accident.”28 As such 
the production of literature cannot be considered to fall within the realm of 
26 Aristotle, The Complete Work of  Aristotle, De (26), Interpretation, Ed., 
Jonathan Barnes, Vol. 1 Princeton New Jersey, 1984, 18b1.
27 Al-Kindi, Abu Yusuf  Ya’qub ibn ’Ishaq as-Sabbah, Rasail Al-Kindi al-
Phalsaphia (The Philosophical Treatises of  Al-Kindi, edited by Muhammad 
Abu Zayda, Cairo, Hassan Press, 2nd Edition, p. 117.
28 Al-Farabi, Abu Nasr, Al’’Ibara, corroborated by Muhammad Salim, Dar al-
Kutayeb, 1976, p.19. 
68
definitive statements, and what does not fall within the realm of definitive 
statements cannot be considered to have any relationship with objectivity.
The interpretation by Al-Jabiri of Al-Jahiz’ text, which states that the 
linguistic activity of Arabs was an appropriation of rational activity, 
is compatible with his judgment that the world from which the Arabic 
language was collected, during the Era of Codification, was an ahistorical 
sensual world. Codification according to Al-Jabiri “is the first indication 
of the manifestations of creativity and innovation by this reason. It is the 
constituent reason in Islamic culture, reason in its foremost manifestations 
and strongest formations.”29 According to Al-Thahabi, the Era of 
Codification began in the year 14 AH”30 and “it continued between the 
mid-second and mid-third century AH”31. That is, Arab reason, before the 
middle of the second century AH, was neither creative nor innovative.
Not only does Al-Jabiri make the judgment that Arabs were neither 
creative nor innovative before the Era of Codification, but he goes on to 
include in such judgment Arab reason and Islamic civilization in their 
entirety. He states: “the reason that has compiled or collected the language 
from Bedouin Arabs, and only from them, has subsequently kept in the 
language the impact of their lives that is, some of the characteristics that 
stem from their living conditions especially the sensual nature of their 
thinking and perception. The collection of language from Arab Bedouins 
and not from others means that this language is confined by the limitations 
of the world of those Arabs.”32 And, the world “from which the Arabic 
language emerged,” or at least was collected from, is, according to al-Jabiri, 
“an ahistorical sensual world.”33 So, if we may name the Islamic civilization 
by one of its products, then we need to say that it is “a civilization of Fiqh 
(Jurisprudence).” Thus, Greek civilization is “a civilization of philosophy”, 
and contemporary European civilization is “a civilization of science and 
technology”34. With regards to Islamic civilization, it should be noted here 
that jurisprudent reason is “one whose ingenuity is almost restricted to 
29 Al-Jabiri, Muhammad ‘Abed, The Formation of  Arab Reason (in Arabic), p.65. 
30 Al-Suyuti, Jalaluddin ‘Abd Al-Rahman Bin Abi Bakr, Tarikh Al-Khulafa’ 
(The History of  the Caliphates), Dar Ibin Hazm, 2003, p.208.
31 Al-Jabiri, Muhammad ‘Abed, The Formation of  Arab Reason (in Arabic), p.67. 
32 Ibid, p. 86.
33 Ibid, p. 87.
34 Ibid, p. 96. 
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researching the origin of each branch, and thus everything new that can be 
measured according to something old”35.
To assert his judgment of the world where the Arabic language was collected 
as being “an ahistorical, sensual world”, al-Jabiri states that the meaning of 
reason in the Arabic language, and subsequently in Arab thought, is associated 
with behavior and morals. This can be clearly seen in the various definitions 
that the Arabic dictionary gives to article “ayn, qaf, lam”, where there is a 
necessary inherent association between the definition and moral behavior.”36
If we take article “ayn, qaf, lam” in the Arab tongue we find that it means the 
reason the heart, and the heart the reason. Reason was named so, because 
it helps man avoid being in danger, that is, it imprisons man (it prevents 
him from any hazardous involvements). To explain further, reason is what 
distinguishes mankind from other animals, and that a reasoning heart and 
a questioning tongue is what creates understanding. I understood a thing 
means I reasoned it, I knew it. And to know a thing is to have knowledge 
of it, al-’Irfan (knowledge) or al-’Areef and al-’Aref meaning to know and 
to be knowledgeable. The name “’Aql” (reason) came to mean “to enable 
the person using his reason to avoid engaging in hazardous behavior, to 
imprison him/her.” So, the association of the verb to reason with dangerous 
activities does not necessarily make it a sensual verb. Thus to say: to a person 
a reasoning heart, is to refer to the desire for knowledge. So “when Mu’awiya 
summoned Daghfal, he asked him “about the ancestors of Arabs, and about 
the stars, and about the Arabic language and the ancestors of Quraysh. 
Daghfal reacted by telling him everything. A man of knowledge, who 
witnessed this exchange, said, how did you memorize all of this? Daghfal 
answered, with a questioning tongue and a reasoning heart”37, “and the 
tragedy of knowledge is forgetting. Then Mu’awiya told Daghfal, go to 
Yazid and teach him about the ancestors of Arabs, and about the stars, and 
35 Ibid, p. 105.
36 Ibid, p. 30.
37 Al-Baihaqi, Al-Hafez, Al-Madkhal Ila Al-Sunun Al-Kubra (commonly 
known as Sunan al-Bayhaqi), edited by Muhammad Al-A’thami, Riyad, Dar 
Adwa’ al-Salaf, vol.2 1420, p. 10.
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teach him also the Arabic language.”38 This thus means that the statement 
“a reasoning heart” contradicts what al-Jabiri says. Secondly, even if we go 
along with al-Jabiri and accept that the association of the verb, to reason, 
with dangerous activities makes it a sensual verb, the meaning of the verb 
“ayn. qaf. lam”, or aqala, to reason, as mentioned in Arabic sources, also 
has to do with understanding39; to know a thing is to understand it. This 
was demonstrated in a rather profound way in the linguistic activity of the 
pre-Islamic Arabs which was an expression of the nature of their existence 
and a reflection of the maturity of their comprehension and cognition. 
So the Arabs, “even though they concerned themselves with expressions 
which they rectified and refined, the meanings of these expressions were, 
however, much more important, and more respected and honored by them. 
And since expressions conveyed meanings and the purposes behind such 
meanings, they endeavored to improve them, enrich them and in fact they 
went out of their way to enhance them: so as to ensure that that would 
have the right expressional impact upon them and would as well be more 
representative of what they exactly meant or wanted to say”40. To further 
support this point, it would be helpful to cite two examples which have 
to do with how Arabs used language to account for their understanding 
of water. The first concerns the names to categorize the various sources of 
water, and the second concerns how they categorized the quantities and 
qualities of water in nature.
The names used to account for different water sources were, from al-sahab (the 
cloud) saha, from al-yanbou’ (the fountain), naba’a, from al-hajar (the stone), inbaja, 
from al-nahr (the river), faada, from al-saqf (the ceiling), wakafa, from al-qirbah 
(the water bottle), saraba, from al-Ina’, (the container), rashaha, from al’ayn (the 
eye), inskaba, from al-mazakeer, natafa, and from al-jurh (the wound), thagha.”41
38 Ibn Abd al-Barr, Abu Umar Yousef  Ibn Abdallah, Al-Isti’ab Fi Ma’rifat Al-
Ashab (The Comprehensive Compilation of  the Names of  the Prophet’s 
Companions), edited by ‘Ali al-Bajawi, Beirut, Dar al-Halabi, 1412 AH, vol. 
2, p. 462. 
39 Look at Al-Tahawuni, Muhammad Bin ‘Ali, Mau’sou’at Kishaf  Istilahaat 
al-Founoun wal ‘Uloum, corroborated by ‘Ali Dahrouj, Beirut, Maktabat 
Lubnan, vol. 1, Al-Aql. 
40 Al-Qalqashandi, Abu Al-Abbas Ahmad ben Ali, Subh al ‘Ashah, Cairo, Dar 
al-Koutub al-Khidiwiyya, 1913, pp.183-184.
41 Al-Tha’alibi, Abu Manşūr ‘Abd ul-Malik Bin Muhammad, Fiqh al-Lugha 
Waasrar al-‘Arabiyya, p. 305.
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As for the categorization of the quantities and qualities of water in nature: “if 
water was continuously flowing and did not split into a fountain or a well, it is 
‘ad, and if one of its banks was moved and its other side was not affected, it was 
karr. If it was overflowing (abundant) and fresh, it was ghadq. If it was flooding 
(drowning), it was ghamr. If it was underground, it was ghawr. If it was running, 
it was ghayl. If it was surface water unaffected by a machine like a waterwheel 
or noria, it was saih. If it was running on surface it was ma’in and sanam. And if 
it was flowing between the trees, it was ghalal. If it was a swamp in a hole or a 
hollow, it was thaghab. If it was ditched from the bottom of the well, it was nabt. 
If a bit of it diverted from its main flow, it was ghadir. If it reached the ankles, 
it was dahdah. If it was close from the bottom of the well, it was dahl. If it was 
very little, it was dahl. If it was even a little less, then it was washal and thamad. 
If it was pure and not mixed with anything, it was qarah. If cloth fell in it to the 
point of being soaked, it was sadam. If animals walked in it and muddied it, it 
was tarq. If it was changing, it was sajas…”42 In addition to this, there are thirty 
one other names to categorize the quantity and quality of natural water sources. 
Al-Tha’labi lists these in (fiqh al-Lugha, the jurisprudence of language,). And 
about this, al-‘Askari says: that Quraysh was named, during al-Jahilliyah, al-
’Alamiyyah (universality), for the virtues and knowledge (science) of its people.”43 
Thus, in this context comes Abi ‘Amro Bin al-‘Ala’s saying: What has come 
from the Arabs is but the very little. And if it came in abundance, you would 
have received a lot of knowledge and poetry.44
Categorizing the quantities and qualities of water in nature, and the flow 
of water from its sources, are just two examples of their cognition of their 
environment. That is, the issue for Arabs is neither about the discussion 
regarding the one hundred names that are given for the snow amongst the 
Eskimos nor is the case that their linguistic activity was confined to the 
multiplicity of the names given to the sword and the characteristics of the 
camel. Instead it involves a comprehensive activity that accounts for all the 
phenomena that exist in life and also the conditions of life.
Based on this, in our attempt to attend to the question regarding the 
relationship between the sensed and the abstract, we can establish that the 
42 Ibid.
43 Al-‘Askari, Abi Hilal al-Hasan Bin ‘Abd Allah, Alawael, edited by Muhammad 
al-Wakeel, Dar Al-Basheer Lilthaqafa al-‘Arabiyya, 1987, p. 65. 
44 Al-Jamhi, Muhammad Bin Salam, Tabaqat Fuhoul al-Shu’araa, explained by 
Mahmoud Muhammad Shaker, Cairo, Dar al-Ma’aref  liltiba’a Walnashr, (no 
date of  publication provided), p 10. 
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accuracy in describing what is sensed using names is what distinguishes 
language, and it is therefore the basis for moving from the sensory to the 
abstract, in terms of segmenting what can be seen - the experience. For 
example, Arabs used numbers (one, two, etc.) to describe the transformations 
of al-Anwa’ (the stars), and time (i.e. to numerically set the tone for nature). 
They also attached numbers to letters in order to create a law of motion and 
rhythm that undoubtedly mirrored the movement of nature in an abstraction 
that corresponded to the transformations of the balanced rhythm of numbers. 
Similar to the names of water, there is, for example, a text, which is cited by 
the researcher Farid al-Zahi45 and attributed to the grandfather of Imru’ al-
Qais, which lists the precise names of the parts s of the body. These words 
describe integral aesthetic forms that suggest clear images describing the 
beauty of the body. Similarly, what corresponds to the description of the 
body is the description of poetry of what exists, such as the existence of the 
house, that is abstraction starts conforming to the image or form in the line 
of poetry or in the concept of the house in itself. Then the line of poetry is 
composed in a balanced numerical rhythm, where the movement of language 
becomes a reflection of things themselves and what regulates it are rules that 
are themselves one and that are applied both in the universe and in poetry and 
the knowledge of one generates the knowledge of the second.46 
The abstraction established by the Arabs, takes us from the process of portraying 
nature to that of the abstract meaning, going through the medium of language- 
words, number and numbers. This was, later on, symbolized through the 
endeavor that aimed at abstracting the abstract (God). What this means was 
that the collection of language by Arabs was built upon the abstraction of the 
abstract, even though it was accompanied by a necessary adverse tendency 
to absolute abstraction, the tendency to embody the abstract, up and down, 
standing and sitting as in the motion of praying.
The nature and meaning of  the position
Although researchers looking into Arabs before Islam were using sound 
scientific theory, it did not provide them with the rationale to reconsider their 
a priori ideas. In other words, when these researchers found enough evidence 
that contradicted their ideas about the customs and traditions of Arabs and 
45 Al-Zahi, Farid, Al-Jasad Wal-Istratijiyya al-Mazhariyya Fi al-Thaqafeh al-Arabiyya 
al-Islamiyya, al-Carmel, Ramallah, 1998, No. 54, p. 105.
46 Look at: Al-Barghouti, Hussein, “Qisas ‘An Zaman Wathani”, al-Carmel, 
Ramallah, 2002, No. 72-73, pp. 297-336. 
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/or their living activity, they still found themselves carried along by their 
previously formed conclusions rather than reconsidering or deconstructing 
them, as is usually done by most scientists. They thus abandoned their 
scientific reference and took Arabs out of the framework or realm of scientific 
explanation. Mohammad Tawfic Abu ‘Ali, for instance, was ready to 
exclude Arabs from any theoretical explanation or even scientific theoretical 
explanation that he endorsed in his studies. He even expressed his inability 
to understand the incompatibility between the Arabs’ linguistic activity and 
their living conditions, traditions and customs, or rather, what he believed 
them to be as was evident in his statement that : “It is excessively strange for 
this refined system to be a result of spontaneity and intuition, especially given 
that it was shaped and dictated by the conditions of nomadic life and the then 
prevailing mode of relationships, and was based in its entirety on instability. 
It is a strange coincidence that the emergence of this system of terminology 
was not consistent with the broad spread of knowledge, as expected by 
the law of scientific development of any society, especially considering the 
significant decline in writing and reading, and the preponderant semi- to 
complete illiteracy that dominated the vast majority of people. However what 
is surprising is the accurate terminology that was commonly used amongst the 
people, and which was more like a public heritage or an endowment that is 
common to all, in which everybody participated without exception.”47
If it is extremely surprising for such a refined system to be dictated and shaped 
by the conditions of nomadic life, so perhaps the situation was not a result of 
spontaneity, and was not, in fact, dictated by nomadic life. And, in any case, 
Arabs before Islam “were not one society but were different inharmonious 
social classes, representing the human societies that humankind has passed 
through in its long history”48, especially that the discussion here is not, as Abu 
Ali states, about the articulation of idiomatic expressions that was restricted to 
one tribe or to a small group of people while others were excluded. It is bout 
the fact that these idiomatic expressions were, without exception, common 
amongst pre-Islamic society as a whole. 
What is even more peculiar is the distinction that Abu ‘Ali makes between 
idiomatic expressions and knowledge. Idiomatic expressions are not just 
knowledge of the existence of a certain thing; they signify knowledge of a thing 
47 Abu ‘Ali, Muhammad Tawfic, Al-Amthal al-‘Arabiyya wal ‘Asr al-Jahili, Beirut, 
Dar al-Niqash, 1988, p. 127.
48 Al-Assad, Naser Aldeen, Masader al-Shi’r al-‘Arabi, Cairo, Dar al-Ma’aref, 
1978, p. 9. 
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that comes as a result of making a distinction. These expressions therefore 
represented knowledge and understanding of things. And this means that these 
commonly used idiomatic expressions represented a common knowledge and 
understanding in Arab society. This is not only true of idiomatic expressions, 
but also of linguistic representation, which we can judge to show maturity 
of thought. This is so because “thought and language are in a continuous 
state of innovative interaction with one another and each of the two derives 
its common nourishment and creative dynamism from daily existential (life) 
practices, i.e. from both the individual and collective history”49.
Despite the fact that Abu ‘Ali was aware of how common these idiomatic 
expressions among the Arabs were and the reasons for their existence and diffusion, 
and despite his understanding that terms or expressions are some of the most 
important pillars of “cultural technology”, and “that when terms in a language 
become clear for a certain people, this indicates o the clarity of their vision and the 
maturity of their language to the level where it was able to achieve real cognitive 
awareness”50, all of this, nevertheless, did not induce him to reconsider his belief 
of the ignorance of the Arabs or to relook at and reconsider his research findings 
and their subsequent assumptions. Instead of doing that, he insisted on excluding 
Arabs from any theoretical explanation., combining as a result two opposites: the 
lack of knowledge and the spread of idiomatic expressions..
Excluding Arabs from typical theoretical interpretations and combining 
contradictory ideas are features of most research studies that have to do with 
pre-Islamic Arabs. There is an embedded assumption here that there is neither 
a problem in the inconsistencies ies nor with the contradictions. So if it is, 
according to the established scientific method, acceptable to to remedy these 
inconsistencies by modifying or replacing the theoretical framework, then 
refusing to do so and excluding only Arabs from any theoretical interpretation 
is a point at issue. The question in this case is not about the correctness of the 
theory, or about its ability to interpret, but about the credibility of researchers 
themselves, and about the degree of their adherence to the requirements of the 
theoretical framework they choose to adopt or follow.
There is more than one example of such an approach in studying pre-
Islamic Arabs. There are so many in fact that it has become possible to say 
49 Arkoun, Muhammad, Tarikhiyet al-Fikr al-‘Arabi al-Islami, Translated by 
Hashem Saleh, al-Dar al-Baida’, Al-Markaz al-Thaqafi al-‘Arabi, Beirut, 
Markaz al-Inma’ al-Qawmi, 1998, p.8
50 Abu ‘Ali, Muhammad Tawfic, Al-Amtha, p. 127
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that we are dealing with a phenomenon, the symptoms of a syndrome in 
the research conducted on pre-Islamic Arabs. So we find somebody like 
Tarabishi contrasting the development of Arabic with the usual development 
of language. He claims that “despite the fact that the development of language 
is usually very slow… the development of the Arabic language over a period of 
fourteen centuries has, on the contrary, taken the form of mutations”51. Others 
like ‘Isam Qasabji insists on categorizing the ‘expression’, in accordance with 
general rules and criteria, as a self-expression, denying, in consequence, the 
intellectual activity among the Arabs. He writes,“poetry is strong among the 
Bedouins while weak among those who live in the city, while literary criticism 
is weak among the Bedouins and strong in the city. So it might be said here 
that cultural intellect spoils poetic intuition, for it provides the mind with 
more than one path, and sets before it more than one possibility, making it 
difficult for the poet to choose between thinking and expression while intuition 
features what is agitating in the character or nature of man before affecting 
the sharpness of reason and thus we feel, in intuitive poetry the pulse of life 
more than can we feel in the logic of reason”52. In this, he contrasts reason and 
intuition and separates the urban situation from the Bedouin situation and 
the cultural intellect of urban life from the intuitive poetry of Bedouin life. He 
considers the activity of reason as a more developed stage than sensation and 
intuition53. He however is not content with just separating the two situations, 
nor is he satisfied with denying the existence of any activity of reason among 
the Bedouins, such as literary criticism, for instance, but he even goes further 
to rectify the properties in Arab Bedouin life, claiming that “the problem 
during the Jahiliyya period was that sensation was partly hidden so it couldn’t 
transform into a principle of reason; because as a stage it precedes reasoning.”54 
Apart from the problems associated with Qasabji’s claim of the existence of 
a relationship between the strength or soundness of poetry and the Bedouin 
situation, which Ahamd Amin demonstrates the weakness of in his book 
(Sadr al-Islam, Early Islam)55, his assertion that: “the problem during the 
Jahiliyya period was that sensation was partly hidden and could not transform 
51 Tarabishi, George, The Critique of  the Critique of  Arab Reason, p 208
52 Qasabji, ‘Isam, Usoul al-Naqd al-‘Arabi al-Qadeem, Halab, Manshourat Jame’at 
Halab, 1991, pp.5-6. 
53 Ibid, p. 6.
54 Ibid.
55 Amin, Ahmad, Fajr al-Islam, Mawsu’at Ahmad Amin al-Islamiyya, Beirut, Dar 
al-Kuttab al-’Arab, 1969, p.22.
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into a principle of reason, because as a phase it precedes reasoning” and his 
argument in the same book that “what perhaps most prominently clarifies the 
features of Jahiliyya criticism is what was narrated about Qubat (the dome of ) 
al-Nābia al-Dubyānī, widely known in Souk ‘Uqaz (the Market of ‘Uqaz), 
where he identified the features of aesthetic criticism which deny the poet the 
freedom to express as he wishes or as he feels, and require him to express in 
accordance with tradition and ideals”56, all beg the question how he did he 
manage to combine these contradictions.
So al-Nābiga’s criticism and his desire to have poets express themselves in 
accordance with traditions and ideals, means that these rules and criteria are 
defined, known and agreed upon. That is, a criterion can be used generally by a 
large group only if its features become clear. So, in this context, poor artisanship 
among Arabs was defined as that “inconsistent behavior and performance: for 
instance, when one is unable to divide the lines (of a poem), explain correctly, 
quote and apply properly, and weave and cast rightly”57. So without this definition 
and its commonality, it would not be possible to understand the mere possibility 
of the criticism that Tarafa Ibn al-‘Abd made, when he was still very young, 
towards Al-Mutalammes for using descriptions inappropriately58, nor to explain 
people’s approval of Tarafa’s criticism but even the acceptance of Al-Mutalammes/
or Al-Musayyib Bin ‘Alas himself of Tarafa’s criticism. It is also not possible to 
understand without this definition, Qubat al-Nābiga, for which he was famous in 
Souk ‘Uqaz, or his recognition or awareness of the deficiency in his own reciting 
while entering Yathreb, saying while leaving it: I entered Yathreb and found in my 
poetry an artisan, and so when I left it, I felt of the Arabs.59  
It is true that Tarafa Ibn al-‘Abd could have criticized al-Mutalammes and that 
people could have accepted his criticism without having to use a criterion that 
was accepted by both sides. It is also possible to explain the criticism that the 
people of Yathreb made against al-Nābiga and his acceptance of such criticism 
without having to revert to criteria for reciting accepted to both sides. Al of 
this does not however solve the problem, especially knowing that the difficulty 
56 Qasabji, ‘Isam, Usoul al-Naqd, p. 6. 
57 Al-‘Askari, Abi Hilal al-Hasan Bin ‘Abd Allah, Al-Sina’atayn, Al-Kitabat wal-
Shi’r, corroborated by ‘Ali al-Bijawi wa Akharoun, Dar Ihya’ al-Koutub al-
‘Arabiyya, 1952, p.44.
58 What is meant here is Qisat of  Al-Mutalammes wa Istinwaqihi Lil-Jamal, 
according to Taraf  Bin al-‘Abd said.
59 Al-‘Askari, Abi Hilal al-Hasan Bin ‘Abd Allah, Al-Sina’atayn, p. 45.
77
in Qasabji’s position does not end here, but includes his combination of n 
two contradictory meanings in the term itself as Abu ‘Ali’s combines the lack 
of knowledge and the spread of idiomatic expressions to describe the situation 
itself. Qasabji combines an expression in accordance to mood and desires, and 
an expression in accordance to norms and ideals. The expression in accordance 
to norms or ideals is an expression that is formulated in conformity to rules 
and criteria that are neither subjective nor are they arbitrary in nature. 
This means that what is required here is for one to distance oneself from 
subjectivity and personal desires for it is not possible for the critique, and this 
is Qasabji’s request, to be in accordance to Bedouin’s intuition that is based 
on the fluctuation of mood and desires. Because how would it be possible for 
an expression in accordance to mood, to be at the same time an expression in 
accordance to sensible criteria? Thus the request for an expression can either 
be moody in nature and in accordance to the desires of al-Nābiga at the 
moment of his critique, or it can be in accordance to what is customary and 
known amongst them.
The contradistinction of the evidence that the researcher possesses together with 
his position towards the Arabs, make him like a person who is sitting on a swing 
not knowing where to stop it. So we realize that after the researcher makes a list of 
the evidence, he diverts to a different position passing judgments that contradict 
the his evidence, attempting at the same time to fill the gap resulting from such 
contradiction with various ways, making other methodological mistakes. And 
the price he has to pay as a researcher will be nothing less than abandoning his 
understanding of the nature of things and of all the classifications and definitions 
of each theoretical framework he armed himself with. However, the issue still did 
not end here as some Arab researchers went further in their attack to include Arab 
accomplishments in linguistics. They emptied these accomplishments from their 
meanings and employed them against the Arabs themselves exactly as Yusef 
Zeidan considered the refusal of Arabs to accept the idea of the intermingling 
or interaction of the Gods with the humans to be a deficiency. That was what 
Mustafa ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibrahim also did with the accomplishments of 
Arabs in linguistics, which was basically another attempt to fill the gap between 
the evidence about the reality of Arab life, as it became apparent to them in 
their research results, and their a priori beliefs about them.
Ibrahim states, in a rather detailed and extended manner, his understanding 
that Arab poetry could not have emerged in conformity with this impeccable 
system in which we found it flourishing. And the reason for that is that nature 
rejects mutations in such a matter, and subsequently must accept the principle 
of development and progress. Subsequently, it is only natural for poetry among 
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the Arabs, as was known about it, to have gone through long historical periods 
to reach the level of maturity and aligned order it has eventually attained. 
Then he concludes from this that the poet must “have, in every step of his 
development on the ladder of life, stopped to turn back his face to what has 
preceded him, so as to prepare himself for the second step. Then he would 
have new insights with which to further develop his poetry or correct or fix 
any thoughtlessness. He could then revise the poems based on what he had 
learned from his previous mistakes and the experiences of other poets. And 
in each of the steps he takes, he disproves or denies what have other people 
found in his work as deficient, while he adds what will positively contribute 
to the structure of the poem he has constructed”60. But, after Ibrahim talks 
about maturity and aligned order, and the preparedness for the future steps 
and the new leaps, and the renewal in the construction of the poem, and the 
benefits one acquires from previous mistakes, he adds, in the same page of 
the same book, as if he is retracting so that nobody will criticize him, “when 
this poetry reached the level of maturity and its artistic image was completed, 
Arabs were fascinated by it and they thus praised it, relished it and viewed 
it in a way that corresponds to their life and nature and their non-urban 
lifestyles. Accordingly”, he adds, “they declared their appreciation of what 
they considered to be good and their disapproval of what they considered 
to be repulsive in brief terms and abrupt judgments, which although correct 
and just, were dictated by common sense or intuition, and not by the deep 
research, examination and logic that emanate from analysis and reasoning”61. 
Ibrahim’s judgment that linguistic activity does not accept mutation 
corresponds with his description of the behavior of poets in the pre-Islamic 
period. Zuheir Bin Salma is, for instance, the best example of a poet who 
criticized his own poems. He named his long poems al-Hawliyyat “because 
they were not composed all at once, and were not announced at the moment 
of their completion…and of those poets from the Jahiliyya period who were 
famous for criticizing their poetry were Aws Bin Hajar, and Zuheir Bin 
Abi Salma, and Ka’b Bin Zuheir, and al-Hutaya, and Tufail al-Ghanawi, 
and Nimr Bin Tawlab and others”62. So what we can deduce from the above 
is that these poets did not just compose their poems without any kind of 
critical and deep thinking. On the contrary, in the process of composing they 
60 Ibrahim, Mustafa ‘Abd al-Rahaman, Fi al-Naqd al-Adabi al-Qadeem ‘Ind al-
‘Arab, Cairo, Makka Lil- Tiba’at, 1998, p.28.
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid, p. 63
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subjected their poems to critical thinking, experimentation and examination 
and they in fact went through them line-by-line and verse-by-verse, carefully 
choosing their words and meanings. They would then keep their poems for a 
period of time reconsidering and reexamining various parts before presenting 
them to the public. Hence, Shawqi Dayf concludes that such an approach, 
which was prevalent amongst the poets in the Jahiliyya period, was “but a 
clear development of a common critical spirit”63, which emerged after their 
language reached the level of perfection and was articulated in “a highly 
developed form of maturity as far as the syntax, conjugation and etymology 
are concerned, or as far as the broad diversification in the composition, the 
sources, the conjunctions, the tools of exclusion, negation, definition and 
travesty are concerned and up to the indeclinable words and to the point 
of the culmination of an internally disciplined and complete system. This is 
in addition to its ability (the Arabic language’s ability) to retain letters and 
loopholes that were not fully retained by other Semitic languages such as al-
thaa, al-khaa, al-thaal, al-thaa, al-daad, and al-ghayn”64.
If that was the case, and if Ibrahim’s theoretical understanding correctly 
corresponds with Arab literary activity, how would looking back to the past in 
order to prepare one’s self to the step that follow lead to maturity and aligned 
order, and even, according to what he says, to the construction of a complete 
poetic system, if their account of what they considered to be good or to be 
repulsive were but quick judgments on their part? Further, is it possible for such 
judgment to extend over a long year and be quick at the same time?
However the problems with Ibrahim’s argument and discussion do not end 
here for when he connects between “brief expressions” and “quick judgments,” 
he imbues the word “brief ” with negative characteristics, despite the fact that 
it is one of the most important features of the Al-Jahiliyya period. It was in 
fact defined by ‘Arafa Abdallah Bin Sinan al-Khafaji “as that which gives the 
meaning of a comprehensive matter in a clear and comprehensive manner, and 
does not, due to being over-succinct, disguise and conceal the true meaning 
of a thing to the point where there would be a need for deep reflection and 
accurate thinking, for it is but improper and imperfect to say anything of this 
sort”65. For Ibn al-Roumi eloquence is that “which can be excellently succinct 
when it comes to intuition or spontaneity, and abundant when it comes to 
63 Dayf, Shawqi, al-Naqd, Cairo, Dar al-Ma’aref, 5th Edition, p. 23.
64 Dayf, Shawqi, Al-‘Asr al-Jahili, Cairo, Dar al-Ma’aref, 22nd Edition, p. 117. 
65 Al-Khafaji, Abdallah Bin Sinan, Sirr al-Balagha, pp. 243-244, HYPERLINK:-
http://www.kotobarabia.com, retrieved on 27/02/2011. 
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elaborateness”66. Succinct means “to take the few from the many, and the root 
of this lies in the saying: to shorten the branch, i.e., to cut it from its tree”67. 
In fact “Arabs in the Jahiliyya period sought to be succinct and concise in their 
poetry… to the extent that conciseness or briefness became for them a virtue 
that they would request and be proud of”68. 
We are not trying here to have an extensive discussion about a brief or concise 
expression, or about its relationship with Arab eloquence (rhetoric) in the 
Jahiliyya period but we simply want to make the important point that: to 
associate one of the most important features of the pre-Islamic Arab Jahiliyya 
with quick judgments would practically transform such an expression into a 
composite negative and would thus render it as an indicator for an imperfect 
rather than a value added product.
In addition, associating instinct and intuition with Bedouin naivety, as 
both Qasabji and Ibrahim have done, is on par with associating a brief or 
concise expression with quick judgments. As in the cases presented earlier 
this association was another attempt to fill the gap between the researchers’ 
judgments and their evidence in order to back up their a priori ideas.
The Sources and Historicity of  the Position
According to al-Thahabi, following al-Sayouti, “In the year forty three, 
Islamic scientists began to codify al-Hadith (the Prophet’s Sayings), al-
Fiqh (law) and Tafsir (interpretation). Ibn Jarih began his classification 
ing in Mecca, Malik al-Mawta’ was working in Medina and al-Awza’i was 
working in Damascus, and Ibn Abi ‘Aruba and Hammad Bin Salma and 
others were working in Basra, and Mu’ammar was working in Yemen, and 
Sufyan al-Thawri was working in Kufa. Meanwhile Ibn Ishaaq was writing 
about Islamic conquests while Abu Hanifa classified al-Fiqh and opinion 
(the opinions of Islamic fuqaha’, jurisprudents). Shortly after, Hashim and 
al-Laith and Ibn Lami’a, Ibn al-Mubarak, Abu Yusef and Ibn Wahb all 
madetheir classifications. During this era the codification and tabulation 
of science multiplied and Arabic books, language, history and the daily 
stories of people were codified. Before this era (the era of codification and 
classification), all the imams (Islamic religious leaders) were memorizing the 
66 Al-‘Askari, Abi Hilal al-Hasan Bin ‘Abd Allah, Al-Sina’atayn, p. 27.
67 Ibid.
68 Atiyyah, Mukhtar, Al-Ijaz Fi Kalam al-‘Arab wa Nass al-I’jaz, Cairo, Dar al-
Ma’aref  al-Jami’iyya, no date, p. 53. 
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Qur’an or they were narrating science from documented but disorganized 
papers.”69 Such classification induced Al-Jabiri to look at this era, which 
started in 143 AH, as one in which “the image of the Jahiliyya era and the 
first Islamic era was identified”70. Tarabishi, however, made a distinction 
between codification and tabulation.71 Relying on al-Thahabi’s position 
“that before this era (the era of codification and classification), all the 
imams (Islamic religious leaders) were talking about their memorization of 
the Qur’an or about narrating science from documented but disorganized 
papers” and also on his identification of those who were late amongst the 
followers (al-Sahaba) of the third class and the greatest of memorizers and 
those who died in the era of the fourth class, Al-Jabiri postulates that “we 
can ascertain that the historiography for the beginning of “codification”- 
continually in accordance to al-Thahabi - starts with the period between 100 
to 120 AH”72. Subsequently, and in accordance to Tarabishi, the drawing 
or the characterization of the image of the pre-Islamic period should have 
started before the era of Mansour and before 143 AH. 
History books show that there isn’t one identified date that we can make 
reference to as a starting point for codification. There isn’t even agreement on 
when codification started in each field. So Fuad Sizkeen marks the beginning 
of the history of the codification of al-Hadith in “the last quarter of the first 
century and the first quarter of the second century AH,”73. while Ibn Hajar 
al-‘Asqalani goes back to an earlier period stating that the codification of al-
Hadith began in the third quarter of the first century AH, and asserting that 
“upon the order of Omar Bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, Ibn Shihab al-Zuhari was the 
first historian who codified al-Hadith at the beginning of the second century 
AH, and after that period codification and classification proliferated and 
that brought great goodness, thanks to God”74. Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani also 
69 Al-Suyuti, Jalaluddin ‘Abd al-Rahman Bin Abi Bakr, Tarikh al-Khulafa’, p. 208.
70 Al-Jabiri, Muhammad ‘Abed, The Formation of  Arab Reason (in Arabic), p.70. 
71 Tarabishi, George, The Critique of  the Critique of  Arab Reason, p.50. 
72 Ibid, p. 22. 
73 Sizkeen, Fuad, Tarikh al-Turath al-‘Arabi, translated by Mahmoud Hijazi, 
reviewed by ‘Arafeh Mustafa and others, al-Riyad, Jami’at al-Imam 
Muhammad Bin Saud al-Islamiyyah, 1991, vol. 1, p. 119 
74 Al-Asqalani, Ibn Hajar Ahmad Bin Ali, Huda al-Sari li-Fath al-Bukhari 
Muqaddamat Sharh Sahih al-Imam Abi Abdallah Muhammad Bin Isma’il al-Bulhari, 
Cairo, al-Matba’at al-Kubra al-Miriyya, 1301 AH, vol. 1, p. 208. 
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takes back the codification of antiquity and the tabulation of news, to the 
late period of the era of followers, stating that the first historians who made 
a collection of these were al-Rabee’ Bin Sabih, Said Bin Abi ‘Aruba and 
others, and that they classified each section separately.”75 He is talking here 
about the third quarter of the second century AH. So it is important here to 
indicate that this is not incompatible with the claim of the existence of an 
era for the spread of codification and proliferation of classification, but with 
the claim that codification and classification began in a given period. This 
subsequently means that if there was a relationship between codification and 
the pre-Islamic period, the beginning of such identification would be before 
the era of Mansour and the era which extends between 100 and 120 AH.
So treating the beginning of the era of codification as an era “of an imposed 
interfusion from the post to the pre”76, that is as an era when the character of 
the pre-Islamic era was determined, and thus to investigate its beginning as 
an attempt to determine the beginnings when the image of the pre-Islamic 
period was drawn, is in our belief erroneous. This is due to the fact that even 
if the diffusion of codification occurred in a given period this neither means 
that the pre-Islamic era began with the beginning of the diffusion and spread 
of codification, nor does it mean that it ended when the diffusion period was 
completed. Instead the pre-Islamic period is not attached to and did not start 
with the beginning of codification in any field whatsoever. This is due to the 
fact that the act of imposition that Tarabishi talks about is an act which is 
concurrent with every attempt to characterize a previous era even if it was 
not an intended or a conscious one. This is so because any representation 
of the past or ideas from the past is done from our present perspective and 
orientations including our a priori ideas.77 Hence, regardless of the period of 
codification and regardless of whether it has one specific beginning or not, it 
is not possible for the pre-Islamic era to have begun with it. If codification 
means the collection of all sporadic writings, in other words what has been 
copied down, and classification is the tabulation of what have been collected, 
then the roots of classification will be deeper than those of codification and 
of copying. That is, as Tarabishi states, “those who classified first are not 
those who codified and tabulated first, and those who codified first are not 
those who wrote down and read first, for classifications were preceded by 
75 Al-Asqalani, Ibn Hajar Ahmad Bin Ali, Huda, p. 4.
76 Tarabishi, George, The Critique of  the Critique of  Arab Reason, p.10.
77 Coleman, Janet, A History of  Political Thought: From Ancient Greece to 
Early Christianity (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell; 1 edition, June 30, 2000), p.17. 
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books and books were preceded by newspapers. In the text that is ascribed 
to him al-Thahabi talks about those who classified first and not those who 
codified and tabulated first.”78 It is important here to state that an era cannot 
be characterized in only one way and can neither be associated with writing 
nor can it be conditioned by it. If it had to do with writing we would then say 
that the pre-Islamic era is also tied up with or connected to the copying of the 
Qur’an, especially that it contains a number of verses which were relied on, 
after they were interpreted, in creating our current image of the pre-Islamic 
Arabs, such as the verse from Surat al-Jumu’ah79, - in God’s saying: “He it is 
Who sent among the unlettered ones a Messenger from among themselves”, 
and which as a verse was interpreted by al-Tabari80, and al-Baghawi81, and al-
Qurtubi82, to mean Arabs are a nation ignorant of both writing and reading. 
If we, however, take into consideration the possibility that the specific 
understanding of the interpreter was imposed on the interpreted verse 
that and the possibility that the verses were interpreted in accordance 
to the interpreter’s view and opinion of the pre-Islamic period, we have 
then to exclude the Qur’an from the factors that helped characterize the 
Arabs of the Pre-Islamic period as being ignorant of any knowledge of 
reading and writing.
Interpreting ummiyya (illiteracy) as meaning ignorance of writing and 
reading has influenced the interpretation of a number of researchers, such as 
al-Tabari, al-Qurtubi and Ibn Kathir, and consequently created a specific 
image of pre-Islamic Arabs. Verse two of Surat al-Jumu’ah, for instance, 
despite the fact that it clearly refers to the ignorance of al-Kitaab (the book 
of God), and its implicit wisdom, was interpreted to mean the ignorance 
of writing. The continuation of this verse “reciting to them His verses and 
78 Tarabishi, George, The Critique of  the Critique of  Arab Reason, p. 50. 
79 The Holy Qur’an, Surat al-Jumu’ah, verse (2).
80 Al-Tabari, Abu Ja’far Muhammad ibn Jarir, Tafsir al-Tabari Jami’ al-bayan fi 
ta’wil al-Qur’an, edited by Abdallah al-Turaki and others, al-Jizah, Dar al-
Hijra, 2001, vol. 2, pp. 153-154, vol. 28, p. 625. 
81 Al-Baghawi, Abu Muhammad al-Husayn ibn Mas’ud, Tafsir al-Baghawi Ma’alim 
at-Tanzeel, edited by Abdallah Nimer and others, Al-Riyad, Dar al-Taybeh, 
vol. 8, p. 113. 
82 Al-Qurtubi, Abu ‘Abdullah Muhammad ibn Ahmad, Al-Jami’ li-Ahkam al-Qur’an 
wal Mubayen lima Tadamanahou min al-Sunna wa ay al-Furqan, edited by Abdallah 
al-Turaki and others, Beirut, Mussasat al-Risalat, 2006, vol. 20, p. 452. 
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purifying them and teaching them the Book and wisdom-although they were 
before in clear error,” refers to the fact that ummiyya (illiteracy) here is the 
illiteracy of the Prophet or being ignorant of al-Kitaab the Qur’an, like others 
to whom God has delivered His book. So God delivered His book to the 
Prophet through revelations to teach them the Qur’an and to deliver them 
from their delusions or aberrations. Deliverance from their delusion means 
here deliverance from their polytheism and from worshiping gods other 
than God. This was how al-Qanouji83, interpreted this verse, and a number 
of other verses. To further illustrate, “the unlettered people,” or ummiyyun 
84 are referred to in another verse this way, “And there are among them 
(Jews) unlettered people, who know not the Book, but they put trust upon 
false desires and they merely guess.” This was interpreted by al-Baghawi85, 
and al-Tabari86 to mean those who are not good in reading or writing. Al-
Farra’ however, as an indication of the lack of agreement on the meaning 
of ummiyya in the Qur’an, says what is meant by the word ummiyyun in 
this verse is the Arabs who didn’t have a book .87 Al-Asfahani, following 
Qutrub, indicates, in the same place, that “al-ummiyya is inattentiveness 
and ignorance, and so al-ummiy (the illiterate) is who is inattentive and 
ignorant and lacks knowledge.” In this context, Al-Sharastani says, “the 
people of the book used to champion the religion of Al-Asbat [the offspring 
of the twelve sons of Ya’qub (Jacob)] and follow the doctrine of the sons of 
Israel, while al- ummiyyun used to champion the religion of the tribes and 
follow the doctrine of the sons of Ishmael.”88. And those who champion the 
religion of the tribes are those who do not have a book. 
83 Al-Qanouji, Abi al-Tayeb Sadeeq Bin Hassan, Fath al-Bayan Fi Maqased al-
Qur’an, introduced by Abdallah Bin Ibrahim al-Ansari, Beirut, al-Maktabeh 
al-‘Asriyyah, 1992, vol. 14, p. 129.
84 The Holy Book, Surat al-Baqara, verse (78).
85 Al-Baghawi, Abu Muhammad al-Husayn ibn Mas’ud, Tafsir al-Baghawi Ma’alim 
at-Tanzeel, vol. 1, p. 114.
86 Al-Tabari, Abu Ja’far Muhammad ibn Jarir, Tafsir al-Tabari, vol. 2, pp. 153-
154.
87 Al-Isfahani, Abi al-Qasem al-Hassan Bin Muhammad, Al-Mufradat Fi Ghareeb 
al-Qur’an, edited by the Center of  Studies and Research, Cairo, Maktabet 
Mustafa al-Baaz, vol. 1, p. 29.
88 Al-Shahrastani, Abi al-Fath ‘Abd al-Karim Ibn Abi Bakr, Al-Millal awa Nihal,, 
vol. 1, p. 207.
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There are two additional meanings for ummiyya. So, as was shown, the verses in 
themselves do not imply that the meaning of ummiyya is ignorance of writing and 
reading but, on the contrary, they contradict such an interpretation. Ummiyya 
in the verses refers to ignorance of the Qur’an or failure to follow al-Kitaab and 
this corresponds with the essence of God’s message, which is the deliverance from 
aberration or delusion through knowing and following God’s book. In addition, 
the interpretation of ummiyya as meaning ignorance of al-Kitaab corresponds with 
the reasons behind God’s revealing His book to them and with God’s mentioning 
them in His Holy book. Despite that, ignorance of writing and reading was still 
chosen to be one of the meanings when interpreting verses from the holy Qur’an. 
So apart from the reasons behind choosing ignorance of writing as one 
meaning for ummiyya to interpret verses from the Qur’an, was the purpose of 
such interpretation, to show the miracle of the prophet who could not read or 
write89?, as Ibn Ashur explains in his interpretation of verse two from Surat al-
Jumu’ah90, or was it a way to distinguish between the pre and the post Islamic 
period as was the position of the Muslims from the very beginning of the Islamic 
da’wa (call)91? Perhaps more than any other reason, this definition was one of 
the factors that contributed to the prevalent understanding of the pre-Islamic 
period which, in terms of being an option, it could possibly not have been 
chosen to be one. Certainly, considering ignorance as a meaning for the word 
89 There are signs that indicate that the Prophet Muhammad knew reading and 
writing, such as what Qutaiba has mentioned following Sufyan “following 
‘Amro bin Dinar following ‘Ata’ following Safwan bin Ya’li bin following Umya 
following his father saying I heard the Prophet “Peace be Upon Him reading 
at the tribune”. (Al-Hafez Ibn Arabi Al-Maliki, ‘Aridat al-Ahwazi bi-Sharh 
Sahih al-Tarmazi, Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, vol. 2, p. 295), and about 
the truth behind umiyyat (the illiteracy) al-Rasul (the Prophet) and about the 
debate regarding this look at: al-“Asqalani, Al-Hafiz Bin Hajar, the answers 
of  al-Hafiz bin Haha al-Asqalani, edited and studied by Abd al-Rahmanbin 
Muhammad Ahmad al-Qalqashri, al-Riyad, Adwa’ al-Salaf, 2003, p.48.
90 Al-Tahrir wal-Tanwir, vol. 28, p.208.
91 This is shown clearly in Huzaifa bin al-Yaman’s discussion with the Prophet 
of  God: “ Huzaifa bin al-Yaman - may God bless him- said: people used to 
ask the Prophet of  God about goodness and I used to ask him about evil 
fearing that it will befall upon me, so I said: Prophet of  God! We were, during 
al-Jahiliyya, immersed in evil and God has brought such goodness (and we 
are in it), (for God has brought you to us), so will we after this goodness 
experience evil (as was the case before?)” (Al-Albani, Naser Addin, Silsilat 
al-Ahadith al-Sahiha, al-Riyad, Dar al-Ma’aref, vol.6, the first section, 2505). 
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ummiyya, even if ignorance of writing and reading prevailed amongst the pre-
Islamic Arabs, would not change the fact that it was a choice, and it contributed 
to characterizing the per-Islamic period as one whose people were ignorant of 
writing and reading. Such an option corresponds to, or to be precise, does not go 
beyond the boundaries of the obsession of the Islamic da’wa (in other words the 
preoccupation of Muslims to spread the new religion or the message of God).
The obsession, in the first years of the emergence of Islam and in the years that 
followed, was to establish and consolidate the new religion and to confirm the 
holiness of what was revealed as being the prime and only source of knowledge 
and science. Consequently, this led the prophet to prevent anything to be written 
down from his sayings other than that which was revealed to him (the Qur’an). 
So he said, “Don’t write anything of my sayings other than the Qur’an, (and if 
someone) wrote anything other than the Qur’an let it be erased”92, fearing that 
his sayings would be intermingled with what was revealed to him from God. 
People followed this order to a point, and this can be clearly seen in what “Abu 
Hilal bin Ja’far talked about when he said: we were informed by Abu Ismail bin 
Mohammad Al-Saffar: ‘Ali Bin Sahl, Rawh Bin ‘Ubadah and Kahmas talked 
about Abi Nadra saying: I said to Abi Said, shall we write? He said, “I shall not 
let you write; but take from us as we have taken from the Prophet of God.”93
Controversy has arisen over whether the Prophet gave approval and permission 
for his sayings to be written down even though it has been proven that “the 
prevention was during the period of revelation due to fear of confusion with 
his own sayings, and later the permission to do so was given in a different 
period of the prophet’s life,” as Ibn ‘Abd al-Bir mentions, quoting al-Hafez 
in “al-Fath.”94 Or was the prevention general and absolute? The position of the 
Prophet, however, indicates, in the two cases, to his attempt to keep what was 
revealed to him pure even from his own sayings, so as to preserve the purity of 
the divine knowledge and science contained in the revelation. The Qur’an in 
fact constituted for the Prophet the prime and only source of knowledge and it 
was due to that that the Prophet of God said: “Tie science to the holy book”95.
92 Ibn ‘abd al-Bir, Abu ‘Umar Yusef  Ibn Abdallah, Jame’ Bayan al-‘Ilm wa Fadleh, 
corroborated by Abi al-Ashbal al-Zuhayr, al-Riyad, Dar Ibn al-Jouzi, 1999, 
vol. 1, p. 268. 
93 Al-Baghdadi, Taqyeed al-‘Ilm, p. 28.
94 Ibn ‘abd al-Bir, Abu ‘Umar Yusef  Ibn Abdallah, Jame’ Bayan al-‘Ilm wa Fadleh, 
vol. 1, p. 269. 
95 Al-Albani, Mohammad Naser aldin, Silsilat al-Ahadith al-Sahiha, p. 2475.
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The Prophet’s companions followed his in his footsteps and it is in this 
context that we can read in Ali’s speech when he said: “Those who claim 
that we have something we can read that is not there in God’s book as 
evident from this section of the Qur’an, are lying”96. And like Ali, the rest 
of the believers followed the Prophet Muhammad: “our grandfather told us, 
Yazid Ibn Haron informed us, Al ‘Awam Bin Hawshab informed us quoting 
Ibrahim al-Taymi saying: Someone informed Ibn Masu’ud that some have 
a book, so he was restless until they brought him the book, and when they 
brought him the book he erased it (soaking it in water). He then added, 
“the people of the book were destined to hell before you since they accepted 
the books of their scientists and bishops leaving in consequence the book of 
God, or the Old Testament and the Bible, and thus disregarding their divine 
precepts and provisions.”97. Things in fact went so far with them that they 
uttered “the words: we do not write science nor do we make others write it”98. 
Thus, the animosity of those who hated the books (of science) from the early 
Muslims, was because they didn’t want these books to be compared with the 
book of God the Almighty, nor did they want people to be occupied with 
a book other than the Qur’an. People were forbidden to even consider old 
books, because the good from the bad from these books was not known, and 
the Qur’an was superior to them and thus became dominant.”99 
This obsession with the Qur’an and the Muslims’ subsequent refusal to accept 
or even admit the existence of any knowledge or science other than that of al-
Kitaab, and their refusal as well to write down that science, reached the stage 
where the phenomenon of erasing these books, became widespread.100 This in 
itself indicates the level of knowledge pre-Islamic Arabs had reached and partly 
explains why there was not enough evidence of the existence of such knowledge 
except for some sporadic reports about how they used to deal with these books 
in the early years of the emergence of Islam, such as, for instance, what has 
already been discussed regarding their rejection to write or even consider the 
96 Al-Baghdadi, Taqyeed al-‘Ilm, p.110. 
97 Ibid, p. 59
98 Ibn ‘abd al-Bir, Abu ‘Umar Yusef  Ibn Abdallah, Jame’ Bayan al-‘Ilm wa Fadleh, 
vol. 1, p. 275. 
99 Al-Baghdadi, Taqyeed al-‘Ilm, p.61
100 There is no need here to mention here other events of  the erasing of  books 
to demonstrate the extent of  the diffusion of  this type of  occurrences, for 
Arabic resources, Al-Baghdadi, in Taqyeed al-‘Ilm, for instance are full of  
examples about such news. 
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non-Qura’nic science as well as their decision to erase books written by pre-
Islamic Arabs. This is in addition to the widespread existence and abundance 
of books that are known to have existed in the early years of the emergence 
of Islam. All of what was mentioned above constitutes in itself an indication 
of how knowledgeable pre-Islamic Arabs were. This was clearly vouched for 
in what Abu al-Hussein informed us about the camel load of books of Abu 
al-‘Abbas which Kareeb kept in his house, and about “Ali Bin ‘Abd Allah 
Bin ‘Abbas, who, if he needed a book, would send him a message asking him 
to send him few sections of this and that book, and so he would copy his 
requests from the books and would send them to him.”101 This clearly indicates 
to the size of the book exchange between Muslims during that period, which 
could not have been created overnight. That is, the abundance of books and the 
spread of knowledge amongst the Arabs explain the Prophet’s obsession with 
preserving the purity of the revelation that was sent to him and its classification 
as the only and prime reference for knowledge. It is also the only factor that 
can explain the widespread phenomenon of the Muslims’ decision to erase 
books and to evade writing down scientific ideas. This in fact contradicts the 
interpretation of ummiyya in the Qur’an as meaning ignorance of writing and 
reading, and supports the interpretation that it means failure to follow the book 
and/or to be ignorant of it. If ignorance was what prevailed amongst pre-Islamic 
Arabs, Muslims would have definitely found nothing to reject and refrain from 
writing, and there would have been no need for the Prophet of God to say, “he 
who learned a science other than that of God or sought it from a source other 
than God, let him assume (or expect) his place in Hell.”102. And if ignorance of 
writing and reading were what characterized the pre-Islamic Arabs, there would 
have been no need for the elimination of books.
The attempt to preserve the revelation sent to the Prophet and to regard it as the only 
source of reference, and what followed in consequence, indicates, though partially, 
to the reasons behind the lack of evidence that Arabs were a people of knowledge 
and science, which, in its turn, helped formulate the basis behind the development 
of the false opinion that pre-Islamic Arabs were ignorant of writing and reading.
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